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The scope of the President’s legal authority is determined in part by
historical practice. This Essay aims to better understand how such
practice-based law might operate as a constraint on the presidency. In
part because of the limited availability of judicial review in this area,
some commentators have suggested that presidential authority has
become “unbounded” by law and is now governed only or primarily by
politics. At the same time, there has been growing skepticism about the
ability of the familiar political checks on presidential power to work in
any systematic or reliable fashion. Whether and how practice-based law
might constrain the President are thus vital questions. As the Essay
explains, no examination of those questions can succeed without careful
specification of what legal constraint entails and how it relates to
distinct but related phenomena like genuine disagreement about the
content of the law. After attempting such specification, the Essay
identifies various internal and external causal mechanisms through
which law, including practice-based law, could constrain the President.
The Essay argues, among other things, that one way that law might
operate as a constraint is through the simple fact that issues of
presidential power are publicly criticized and defended in legal terms.
The Essay concludes by suggesting some avenues of possible empirical
research.
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INTRODUCTION
Presidential power in the United States is determined in part by historical practice. Especially when the text of the Constitution is unclear or
does not specifically address a particular question, the way in which the
government has operated over time can provide what Justice Frankfurter
famously called a constitutional “gloss” on presidential power.1 This gloss
often develops without significant judicial review. A variety of justiciability
limitations—including the general disallowance of legislative standing,
ripeness considerations, and the political question doctrine—are
regularly invoked by courts as a basis for declining to resolve issues of
presidential power, especially when individual rights are not directly
implicated.2 This has been particularly true in the area of foreign affairs,
concerning issues such as the initiation of war, the use of “executive
agreements,” and the termination of international commitments.3 Even
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power
part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’
vested in the president by § 1 of Art. II.”). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W.
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012)
(describing and assessing role of historical practice in determining distribution of
constitutional authority between President and Congress); infra Part I.A.
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 420–21.
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when courts do get involved, they often defer to longstanding practice
when discerning the President’s constitutional (and statutory) authority.4
The customary nature of much of the law governing presidential
power, together with the typically limited role of the courts, might inspire doubts about whether the apparent norms in this area truly are
legal norms capable of constraining the President. Without either a clear
text or an authoritative adjudicator, the argument might run, the
President’s authority is simply the product of the push and pull of the
political process. To the extent that there appear to be stable
arrangements with respect to this authority, they might simply be “nonnormative equilibria” with no authoritative status. If so, any apparent
consistency between presidential behavior and purported legal norms
might simply be the result of political and policy considerations, not any
constraint imposed by law. In recent years, a number of influential legal
scholars have made claims of precisely this sort.5 Other leading scholars,
meanwhile, take the proposition that the President is constrained by law
as irrefutably correct.6 Yet specifying precisely how the President might be
constrained by law is anything but straightforward,7 and it becomes all
the more difficult once one appreciates the practice-based nature of
much of the law of presidential power.
The relationship between law and presidential power is not merely a
matter of academic debate. Whether, how, and to what extent
presidential decisionmaking is subject to legal constraint is a central issue
in the practice of modern government, as illustrated by two recent
episodes. First, in March 2011, the Obama Administration initiated
military operations against Libya without congressional authorization,
and then continued them past the statutory sixty-day limit set forth in the
War Powers Resolution. Critics treated this episode as evidence that the
executive branch did not take seriously constitutional and statutory limits

4. See infra Part I.A. Although the principal focus of this Essay is on the
constitutional law of presidential power, we also consider various statutory regimes as well.
Historical practice informs presidential power under certain federal statutes as well as
under the Constitution, and questions about the law’s constraining effect can arise in both
contexts.
5. E.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (2010)
[hereinafter Ackerman, Decline]; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive
Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (2010) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, The
Executive Unbound]. These and related arguments are discussed at greater length infra
Part I.C.
6. E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 979
(2009) [hereinafter Fallon, Constitutional Constraints] (“[T]he thought that officials
holding constitutionally constituted offices might be wholly unconstrained by the
Constitution proves incoherent.”).
7. Cf. id. (“The most important question is not whether the Constitution constrains,
but how.”).
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on the use of military force.8 Despite a low likelihood that courts would
resolve the dispute, however, the Obama Administration offered public
legal justifications, based heavily on arguments from historical practice,
for both the initial deployment of military force in Libya and its
continuation past the sixty-day point.9 The felt need of the executive
branch to justify itself in legal terms might be puzzling if the law were not
playing any constraining role, but it is difficult to discern precisely what
that role might have been.
Second, in the summer of 2011, a confrontation developed between
the Obama Administration and Republican leaders in Congress over
whether to raise the statutory debt ceiling to accommodate the
government’s increased borrowing. When a legislative extension of the
ceiling appeared unlikely, some commentators suggested, based on
either novel constitutional arguments or pure policy grounds, that the
President could and should unilaterally exceed the debt ceiling.10 Others
insisted that such unilateral action would be unconstitutional because it
would usurp Congress’s constitutional authority “[t]o borrow [m]oney
on the credit of the United States.”11 President Obama did not attempt to
address the issue unilaterally and instead continued to seek a legislative
extension of the ceiling, which he ultimately obtained. Nor did the
President attempt or even threaten a unilateral extension when the issue
resurfaced in late 2012 and early 2013 in connection with the so-called
“fiscal cliff,” by which time such an action appeared to be off the table
altogether. It might be that the President felt constrained not to pursue a
unilateral extension by legal concerns about such a course of action, but
it is also possible that political considerations would have driven the
President to a similar decision.12 In this context too, then, the role of law
is unclear.
Episodes like these underscore the importance of thinking carefully
not just about the general question whether the President is constrained
by law, but more particularly about what it means to say that the
President is so constrained, and how such constraints operate. On issues
of executive power unlikely to come before the courts, one familiar
idea—espoused by James Madison in The Federalist Papers—is that
members of Congress have sufficient personal motivations and
professional resources to protect Congress’s institutional prerogatives

8. See infra notes 168–170 and accompanying text. The actions taken in Libya are
more fully discussed in Part III.D.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 150–151.
10. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
12. For a fuller discussion of the debt ceiling and fiscal cliff issues, see infra notes 80–
86 and accompanying text.
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from executive incursions.13 A number of scholars have concluded, however, that such checking is not as consistent or robust as is often assumed,
and that whether Congress curbs presidential power depends more often
on partisan political considerations or situation-specific policy objections
than on any systematic effort to protect institutional prerogatives.14 If
Congress is not as reliable a check on presidential power as Madison and
others envisioned, there is arguably a greater need for other mechanisms
of constraint in this area, including legal constraints. In the absence of
judicial review, however, it is fair to ask how the legal constraints might
operate.
To the extent that a particular question of presidential power is
recognized as a legal question, it is virtually inevitable that lawyers somewhere within the executive branch will provide advice on the question.
On significant legal questions of presidential power, the lawyers will likely
include individuals within the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC), which advises the White House and other executive
departments on the legality of proposed executive programs and
actions.15 Offices like OLC thus might provide part of the answer to the
question of how, in the absence of judicial review or consistent congressional checking, legal constraints on the President could operate. But in
the aftermath of controversies surrounding some of OLC’s reasoning in
the war on terror, including in the so-called “torture memos” in the early
years of the Bush Administration, some scholars have come to doubt that
OLC (or any other executive branch legal office) imposes genuine legal
limits on the President.16

13. See The Federalist No. 51, at 321–22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the
others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”).
14. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 438–47 (describing various problems
with Madisonian assumption about interbranch rivalry and summarizing literature); see
also Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 671 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Parchment]
(“[A]ll indications are that political ‘ambition counteracting ambition’ has failed to serve
as a self-enforcing safeguard for the constitutional structures of federalism and separation
of powers in the way that Madison seems to have envisioned.”); Daryl J. Levinson &
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2324–25
(2006) (“[T]he political interests of elected officials generally correlate more strongly with
party than with branch . . . . [P]arty is likely to be the single best predictor of political
agreement and disagreement.”).
15. See infra notes 32–38 and accompanying text (describing OLC’s principal
functions).
16. See infra notes 87, 101. Some of the criticisms of an Obama Administration white
paper concerning the legality of targeted killings, which was leaked to the press in early
2013, were reminiscent of the criticisms of the torture memos. See, e.g., Scott Shane &
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This Essay seeks to better frame the question of how law might constrain the President. Although we are not the first to focus on the
relationship between law and presidential authority, our approach is
more systematic than prior treatments. In addition, unlike some
approaches, we treat law and politics as overlapping and interactive
rather than as mutually distinct considerations. Thus, instead of
inquiring whether politics or law constrains the President in a particular
context, our approach identifies mechanisms by which politics and law
operate in either reinforcing or countervailing ways. We also make two
substantive contributions. First, building on our prior work, we explain
how the practice-based nature of the law in this area—a feature not
emphasized by others writing on the topic—poses particular challenges
for any claim that the President is constrained by law. Second, we identify
and explore a mechanism of potential constraint that has not been discussed extensively in the literature: the constraint associated with legal
dialogue itself.
Importantly, we make no claim in this Essay about the sufficiency of
any constraint that law currently imposes on the presidency. Whether
the President is adequately constrained by law depends, first, on a
substantive judgment about the appropriate scope of presidential power,
and, second, on an empirical assessment of whether the law in fact keeps
the President within those bounds. Both of those questions are beyond
the scope of this Essay. Consequently, our analysis may not provide much
comfort to those who are concerned about the growth of presidential
power or about perceived presidential abuses. But one cannot meaningfully engage the normative question of how much the law ought to
constrain the President without first having a clear sense of what such
constraint might entail in an area where the law is deeply informed by
practice, and how the constraint might operate. Our aim is to make
headway on those conceptual and analytical questions. In doing so, we
seek to provide a basis for greater precision when making claims or
raising concerns in this area, and to highlight potential mechanisms of
legal constraint that might otherwise go unnoticed.
Part I describes the law governing presidential authority and how
this law is heavily informed by historical practice. It also explains some of
the limits on judicial review in this area, and notes how commentators on
both the right and left have charged that the President is not meaningfully constrained by law. Part II considers in some detail what it might
mean to say that the President is constrained by law. As this Part shows,
no examination of whether law constrains the President can succeed
without careful specification of what constraint entails and how it relates
to distinct but related phenomena like genuine disagreement about the
Charlie Savage, Report on Targeted Killing Whets Appetite for Less Secrecy, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 5, 2013, at A11.
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content of the law. Part III identifies various internal and external causal
mechanisms through which practice-based law could constrain the
President. Among other things, this Part explains that one way that law
might constrain the President is through the simple fact that issues of
presidential power are publicly criticized and defended in legal terms.
This Essay concludes by noting some of the obstacles to determining
empirically the extent to which legal dialogue or any other mechanism
operates as a constraint on the President, and by identifying some
possible avenues of future research.
I. LAW AND THE PRESIDENCY
A vast array of law—constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and judgemade—is relevant to the executive branch. The specific focus of this
Essay is on the law, especially the constitutional law, governing
presidential authority. This Part describes the prevalence of practicebased argumentation in decisions and debates concerning this body of
law. It also considers some of the limitations on judicial review in this
area. Finally, this Part explains how the combination of unwritten norms
and limited judicial review can lead to skepticism about the extent to
which the President is constrained by law as opposed to mere politics.
A. Historical Gloss and Presidential Power
Reliance on historical practice is a mainstay of decisionmaking and
debates concerning the scope of presidential power.17 In part this is a
function of the limited guidance provided by the constitutional text. Unlike Article I of the Constitution, which contains a long list of
congressional powers, Article II sets forth relatively few specific
presidential powers. The President is made the Commander in Chief of
the armed forces, but the constitutional text does not explain what this
authority entails.18 The President has the power to make treaties and to
appoint various officials, but those powers are shared with the Senate.19
Other clauses in Article II, such as the provisions about receiving
ambassadors and taking care that the laws are faithfully executed, argua17. Examples include debates over the initiation of military hostilities, the conclusion
of executive agreements, and the removal of executive officers. For a detailed discussion of
these examples, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 461–85; see also, e.g., Louis
Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President 19 (5th ed. 2007)
(“Custom is a source of executive power—particularly when Congress fails to challenge
and check.”); William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 2 (1916)
(“Precedents from previous administrations and from previous Congresses create an
historical construction of the extent and limitations of their respective powers, aided by
the discussions arising in a conflict of jurisdictions between them.”).
18. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
19. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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bly sound more like obligations than powers.20 Some scholars contend
that the first sentence of Article II, which states that “[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,”21
implicitly grants the President a broad range of powers, but this claim is
controversial, and, in any event, it highlights the text’s lack of
specificity.22
Responding in part to the limited textual guidance in Article II,
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in the Youngstown steel seizure
case famously emphasized the importance of historical practice to the
interpretation of presidential power. As he put it:
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on
“executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.23
In other decisions, the full Supreme Court has endorsed the significance
of such practice-based “gloss.”
Consider, for example, Dames & Moore v. Regan.24 The issue there
was whether Presidents Carter and Reagan had the authority, as part of
their resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, to transfer billions of dollars
in claims by U.S. citizens against Iran to a new arbitral body being established in The Hague. In concluding that the Presidents had this
authority, the Court noted that “the United States has repeatedly
exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals
against foreign countries” and that “there has . . . been a longstanding
practice of settling such claims by executive agreement without the

20. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).
21. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
22. For debate over the implications of the Article II Vesting Clause, compare
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs,
111 Yale L.J. 231, 234 (2001) (arguing Vesting Clause grants President “a ‘residual’ foreign
affairs power”), with Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism
and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 551–52 (2004) (challenging claim that Vesting
Clause grants President substantive powers). The extent to which historical practice is
viewed as relevant to issues of separation of powers will of course be affected by one’s
constitutional methodology, and strict originalists in particular are both less likely to find
it relevant and more likely to find the constitutional text to be determinate. See Bradley &
Morrison, supra note 1, at 424–25, 431–32; Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer,
126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 75, 81 (2013), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol1
26_lacroix.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
23. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
24. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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advice and consent of the Senate.”25 The Court further emphasized that
“the practice of settling claims continues today” and that Congress had
acquiesced in this practice, both by enacting supporting framework legislation and by “consistently fail[ing] to object . . . even when it has had an
opportunity to do so.”26
Historical practice is also an important component of the canonical
three-tiered framework for assessing presidential power that Justice
Jackson articulated in his Youngstown concurrence. Under that framework, the President’s power is at its highest when supported by express or
implied congressional authorization, in an intermediate “zone of
twilight” when Congress has said nothing, and at its lowest when
Congress has expressly or implicitly prohibited the action in question.27
Historical practice is potentially relevant in each of these categories. It
can help an interpreter determine whether there is implicit congressional support or opposition for purposes of the first and third
categories.28 It is also potentially relevant to whether a presidential power
is exclusive and thus valid even under the third category.29 Perhaps most
obviously, it can play a large role in the intermediate zone, in which the
President and Congress “may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain.”30 Indeed, as Justice Jackson noted, congressional inaction in the face of presidential activity “may sometimes, at least
as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”31
Nonjudicial actors also frequently reference historical practice when
making arguments relating to presidential power. This is certainly true of
the work of OLC, which provides authoritative legal advice to the executive branch based on its best view of the law.32 OLC routinely issues
25. Id. at 679.
26. Id. at 680–82 & n.10; see also, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415
(2003) (concluding President had constitutional authority to settle international law
claims “[g]iven the fact that the practice goes back over 200 years, and has received
congressional acquiescence throughout its history”); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655,
689 (1929) (noting, in case involving question about operation of President’s veto
authority, that “[l]ong settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in
a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character”). But cf. Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (declining to allow presidential memorandum to displace
state law because, among other things, “[t]he President’s Memorandum is not supported
by a ‘particularly longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence, . . . but rather is
what the United States itself has described as ‘unprecedented action’” (citation omitted)).
27. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
28. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 419.
29. See id. at 421–22.
30. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1688, 1713–15
(2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism] (reviewing Ackerman, Decline,
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opinions relating to issues of presidential power, and those opinions frequently refer to historical practice. To take a prominent recent example
mentioned in the Introduction, in 2011 OLC relied heavily on a series of
past presidential uses of military force, in which it claimed Congress had
acquiesced, to support its conclusion that President Obama had the constitutional authority to conduct military operations in Libya without congressional authorization.33 Another recent example is OLC’s analysis of
the applicability of executive privilege to certain Justice Department
documents sought by the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform as part of its investigation into a law enforcement
operation known as “Fast and Furious.”34 OLC’s analysis relied heavily on
past assertions of executive privilege, as well as the rationales proffered to
justify those assertions, to conclude that the documents in question were
covered by the privilege.35
To be sure, there is some variation in precisely how OLC invokes historical practice. For example, its Libya opinion cited historical practice to
establish “the two political branches’ practical understanding . . . of their
respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national defense,”36
whereas its executive privilege analysis cited historical practice to
establish a consistent executive branch position over time, without asserting any agreement by Congress.37 Careful normative assessment of those
supra note 5); see also Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside
the Bush Administration 38–39 (2007) (noting OLC’s success depends on ability to
“preserve its fidelity to the law while at the same time finding a way, if possible, to approve
presidential actions”).
33. See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, (Apr. 1, 2011)
[hereinafter Krass Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/auth
ority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “the historical
practice of presidential military action without congressional approval”). For a critique of
OLC’s reasoning, see Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on the
Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, Harvard Nat’l Security J.F. 1, 3–4 (2011), http:
//harvardnsj.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Forum_Glennon_Final-Version.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (contending “[i]n many of the precedents that provide
the ‘historical gloss’ on which OCL so heavily relies, Congress objected” and many of them
were not on point). This issue is distinct from whether the operation constituted
“hostilities” under the War Powers Resolution. For discussion of that question, see infra
Part III.D.
34. Letter from Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, to President Barack Obama (June 19,
2012) [hereinafter Holder Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/ag-ffexec-priv.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Although the formal document cited
here is a letter from the Attorney General to the President, the fact that the letter appears
on OLC’s website, in a collection of OLC opinions, reflects that OLC is very likely the
source of the substance of the analysis.
35. Id. at 2–4.
36. Krass Memorandum, supra note 33, at 7.
37. See Holder Letter, supra note 34, at 3 (noting “Presidents have repeatedly
asserted executive privilege to protect confidential Executive Branch deliberative materials
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uses of historical practice would require close attention to the different
ways in which historical practice is used and the different reasons underlying those uses.38 Our point here is simply that, for one reason or
another, reliance on historical practice is a common feature of OLC’s
work.
The executive branch’s attention to historical practice is also reflected in presidential issuance of “constitutional signing statements.”
These statements, made when the President is signing a bill into law, call
into question the constitutionality of one or more provisions in the bill
and suggest that the President might not comply with the provisions,
often on the ground that the provisions threaten to interfere with presidential authority.39 As the executive branch has explained, “[p]articularly
since omnibus bills have become prevalent, signing statements have
often been used to ensure that concerns about the constitutionality of
discrete statutory provisions do not require a veto of the entire bill.”40
Although issued by both Democratic and Republican Presidents,41 these
statements are controversial, with some critics claiming that the rule of
law and separation of powers are offended when a President reserves the
ability to disregard part of a bill that he signs into law.42 It does not
from congressional subpoena” and citing multiple precedents from several different
administrations).
38. For discussion of the importance of considering the specific reasons why
historical practice is relied upon in general, as well as the distinction between reasons that
depend on institutional acquiescence and those that do not, see generally Bradley &
Morrison, supra note 1.
39. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Power, 23 Const. Comment. 307, 313–14 (2006). Signing statements are also used for
other purposes, such as explaining to the public why the administration supported the law
or directing officials within the executive branch about how the law should be interpreted
or administered. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President (Nov.
3, 1993), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/signing.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
40. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and
Agencies (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Memorandum-on-Presidential-Signing-Statements (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
41. See Todd Garvey, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33667, Presidential Signing
Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications 2–13 (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing presidential signing statements from Reagan Administration to Obama
Administration).
42. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the
Separation of Powers Doctrine 5 (2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/conte
nt/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/20060823144113.authchec
kdam.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For debate over whether the President is
constitutionally required to veto legislation containing provisions that he believes are
unconstitutional, compare, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto
Unconstitutional Bills, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 81, 81–82 (2007) (arguing there exists
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appear, however, that Presidents commonly disregard the provisions to
which they object in signing statements. This was true even during the
George W. Bush Administration, which had a reputation for being particularly aggressive in its issuance of signing statements.43 Thus, instead of
signaling an active intent to disregard the identified provision, signing
statements may be better understood as attempts by the executive branch
to prevent a claim that it has acquiesced in congressional intrusions on
executive authority. In other words, these statements appear to be
designed, at least in part, to prevent historical gloss from developing in a
way that might limit presidential authority.44
Legal scholarship relating to presidential power, especially in the
area of foreign affairs, also frequently refers to historical practice. A
number of scholars have referenced such practice, for example, in
assessing whether and to what extent the President has the constitutional
authority to initiate military operations in the absence of congressional
authorization.45 Other scholars have emphasized practice in considering
constitutional duty to exercise veto in this situation), with William Baude, Signing
Unconstitutional Laws, 86 Ind. L.J. 303, 309 (2011) (arguing there is no such
constitutional duty). For an opinion by OLC expressing the view that “there are
circumstances in which the President may appropriately decline to enforce a statute that
he views as unconstitutional,” see Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the
President (Nov. 2, 1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
43. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements
Controversy, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 11, 13 (2007) (noting GAO report suggesting
“general compliance by the Bush administration (like its predecessors) with even those
elements of complex statutes the President had identified as constitutionally
objectionable, rather than a bold flouting of Congress”); Nelson Lund, Presidential
Signing Statements in Perspective, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 95, 107 (2007) (noting “the
GAO’s inability to find that the Bush administration failed to comply with even a single
statutory provision as a result of objections articulated in a presidential signing
statement”).
44. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 452–53; see also John Elwood, No
Constitutional Signing Statement for the Guantanamo Transfer Restrictions, The Volokh
Conspiracy (Jan. 9, 2011, 4:08 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/01/09/noconstitutional-signing-statement-for-the-guantanamo-transfer-restrictions (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“[I]n my experience, most legislative provisions that are the subject
of constitutional signing statements are implemented as written, and the signing statement
is done mostly to ‘lay down a marker’ with Congress.”).
45. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. Rev. (Special
Issue) 19, 25–27, 29–31 (1970) (asserting historical practice has legitimized presidential
war-making); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1338, 1355–64 (1993) (reviewing John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: War Power and
the Sirens of Formalism (1993)) (arguing it is “the ‘court of history,’ an accretion of
interactions among the branches, that gives rise to basic norms governing the branches’
behavior in the area”); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers
Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 Yale L.J. 845, 874–76 (1996) (reviewing Louis
Fisher, Presidential War Power (1995)) (considering proper role of history in discerning
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the circumstances under which the President may conclude international
agreements without obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.46
Even outside the foreign affairs area, academic debates about presidential authority—such as about the President’s power to remove executive
officials from office47—are greatly influenced by considerations of historical practice.
None of this is to suggest, of course, that reliance on historical
practice in discerning presidential authority is free from difficulty. One
obvious danger is that, if structural and other factors limit Congress’s
ability to resist assertions of presidential authority, this approach to constitutional interpretation might turn out to ratchet up presidential power
over time. On the other hand, it may be that such a danger can be
adequately checked by paying careful attention, when deciding what historical practices should count, to the actual dynamics of congressionalexecutive relations, including the conditions under which Congress can
truly be said to have acquiesced in particular presidential actions.48 The
key point for present purposes is simply that reliance on historical
practice is a standard part of modern constitutional argumentation and
decisionmaking.
B. Limitations on Judicial Review
If courts routinely reviewed contested issues of presidential power,
they could decide whether and when to credit historical practice in this
area. They could also decide whether novel presidential assertions of
authority were justified, before such assertions became established
practice. But judicial review in this area is anything but routine. Courts
obviously do review issues of presidential power in some instances,
especially when individual rights are perceived to be at stake, as both
Youngstown and the series of Supreme Court decisions concerning the
“war on terror” illustrate.49 When individual rights are not directly impli-

allocation of war powers).
46. E.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L.
Rev. 799 (1995); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236 (2008); Peter J. Spiro,
Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 961 (2001)
[hereinafter Spiro, Treaties]; John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757 (2001).
47. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive (2008);
Harold J. Krent, The Sometimes Unitary Executive: Presidential Practice Throughout
History, 25 Const. Comment. 489 (2009) (reviewing Calabresi & Yoo, supra).
48. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 444–47, 448–52 (arguing for such focus
on dynamics of congressional-executive relations).
49. For the relevant war on terror decisions, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
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cated, however, courts often abstain from addressing questions
surrounding the allocation of authority between Congress and the
President.
Judicial abstention is particularly common in the foreign affairs area.
Consider, for example, the question of whether the President is constitutionally required to obtain congressional authorization before initiating
military hostilities. Despite numerous presidential initiations of hostilities
without congressional authorization in the post-World War II period,
courts have generally refused to consider the issue.50 Courts have
similarly avoided addressing whether Presidents must obtain congressional or senatorial approval before terminating a treaty,51 and whether
and to what extent Presidents may use executive agreements in lieu of
treaties.52
Courts invoke a variety of doctrines in support of this abstention.
They enforce general standing requirements strictly, and, at least since
the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd,53 they typically find
that individual members of Congress lack standing to challenge presidential action.54 Some lower courts also invoke ideas of “political ripeness,” pursuant to which they will not intervene in interbranch disputes
until the affected branch has exhausted its own political resources to
address the purported problem, a requirement that is rarely if ever satisfied.55 Another potential barrier to judicial review is the political question

U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), superseded by statute, Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
50. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that
members of Congress lacked standing to challenge President Clinton’s use of military
force in Yugoslavia); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding
that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s use of military
force in Libya).
51. See, e.g., Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing
complaint by members of Congress against President Bush for withdrawing United States
from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). The D.C. Circuit addressed the merits of a treaty
termination in Goldwater v. Carter, but the Supreme Court vacated the decision on
justiciability grounds. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
52. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2001) (dismissing challenge to constitutionality of North American Free Trade
Agreement).
53. 521 U.S. 811 (1997). In Raines, the Court indicated that members of Congress will
ordinarily lack standing to complain that an action has caused them institutional injury
unless they can show that their votes have been “completely nullified” by the action. Id. at
823–24.
54. See, e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d at 19.
55. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 137 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of
suit seeking to prevent President Bush from initiating military operations in Iraq); see also
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding
challenge to presidential termination of treaty was “not ripe for judicial review” because
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doctrine, which the lower courts apply with some frequency in the
foreign affairs area.56
Academic defenders of this judicial abstention have argued either
that the political branches have adequate resources to protect their
interests,57 or that the courts lack sufficient competence to resolve
separation of powers issues, especially in the foreign affairs and national
security areas.58 Other scholars have bemoaned this abstention as an
abdication of the judicial role and have blamed it for contributing to
what they perceive to be an undesirable growth in executive power in the
modern era.59 The bottom line is that many issues of presidential power
are resolved, if at all, outside the courts. Moreover, even when the courts
do intervene, they are likely to give significant deference to patterns of
governmental practice, especially if the patterns are longstanding and
appear to reflect interbranch agreement.60

Congress had not attempted to use its resources to oppose President’s treaty termination,
and thus there was no “constitutional impasse” between branches).
56. See, e.g., Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, J.); Made in
the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1319.
57. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 275
(1980) (arguing judicial review of boundaries of executive and legislative power is
unnecessary because “[e]ach branch . . . has tremendous incentives . . . to guard its
constitutional boundaries and assigned prerogatives” and “[i]f either branch perceives a
constitutional violation of this kind, . . . [it] possesses an impressive arsenal of weapons to
demand observance of constitutional dictates”); see also Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004
(plurality opinion) (emphasizing, in considering whether President had unilateral power
to terminate treaty, that case involved “a dispute between coequal branches of our
Government, each of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests”).
58. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security,
Liberty, and the Courts 12 (2007) (arguing courts “should defer to government action”
during national security emergencies); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89
Iowa L. Rev. 941, 944 (2004) (arguing considerations of institutional competence support
judicial abstention in foreign affairs area).
59. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 45, at 66–67 (1993) (“The judiciary shouldn’t decide
what wars we fight, but it can insure that Congress play its constitutionally mandated role
in such decisions. It has become imperative that one way or another it do so.”); Thomas
M. Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign
Affairs? 7 (1992) (urging “U.S. federal courts [to] stop abdicating in foreign-affairs cases”);
Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the IranContra Affair ch. 6 (1990) (criticizing phenomenon of judicial deference in foreign
affairs).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 23–31 (discussing cases showing significant
judicial deference to longstanding practices of presidential and congressional power). An
important exception is INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), in which the Court held
unconstitutional a “legislative veto” provision even though Congress had enacted many
similar provisions since the 1930s. While emphasizing that “the fact that a given law or
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government,
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution,” the Court also noted
that “11 Presidents, from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with
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C. Skepticism About Legal Constraint
The general posture of judicial abstention in this area raises
questions about whether presidential power is truly subject to legal
constraints. It is often easier—or at least more familiar—to talk meaningfully about law if there is a reasonable prospect that the actions in
question will face judicial review. Because the courts are unlikely to
intervene in many controversies relating to presidential power—and
because any such intervention is likely to be deferential to the actions of
the political branches—some scholars are inclined to say that Presidents
face (or will soon face) virtually no constraints at all. Part of the concern
here is that Congress by itself often seems either unable or unwilling to
provide adequate checks on executive power. Compounding the
problem, in the view of some scholars, is that institutional arrangements
within the executive branch are not able to constrain presidential
decisionmaking. Bruce Ackerman, for example, claims to identify a range
of developments in “politics and communications, bureaucratic and
military organization,” as well as “executive constitutionalism,” that
threaten to turn the presidency into “a vehicle for demagogic populism
and lawlessness.”61
Other scholars contend that Presidents face some constraints on
their actions, but depict those constraints in extralegal terms. Eric Posner
and Adrian Vermeule, for example, argue that “law does little to
constrain the modern executive,” and that whatever constraints
Presidents do face are instead a matter of “politics and public opinion.”62
On this view, any seemingly stable arrangements affecting presidential
power are simply “non-normative equilibria”63 or focal points of
coordination with no authoritative status.64 If so, the existence of a
particular arrangement might in some instances constrain presidential
action, but it provides no strong normative justification for its continued
existence if political or other extralegal factors pull in a different
direction.
Some of this skepticism, especially when coming from the political
left, is related to a more general concern about the growth of presidential power in the modern era, a concern reflected in the historian
this issue have gone on record at some point to challenge congressional vetoes as
unconstitutional.” Id. at 942 n.13, 944.
61. Ackerman, Decline, supra note 5, at 4.
62. Posner & Vermeule, The Executive Unbound, supra note 5, at 15.
63. Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 993.
64. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1836 (2009) (“We might also
understand the settlement of non-textual constitutional issues as instances of successful
coordination.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 991, 1002 (2008) (“Precedents may just be patterns of behavior that parties
recognize as providing focal points that permit cooperation or coordination.”).
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Arthur Schlesinger’s account of the “imperial presidency.”65 That
concern was especially prominent during the George W. Bush
Administration, which was thought by some to have used the postSeptember 11 security environment as an opportunity to make particularly broad claims of presidential power.66 But concerns about presidential unilateralism have continued into the Obama Administration.67 The
skepticism may also trace to post-Watergate cynicism about the behavior
of government officials, including the extent to which they are likely to
act based on internalized norms.68
Skepticism about the extent to which the presidency is constrained
by law implicates a series of questions relevant to this Essay. Most
generally, what is the relationship between law and politics in this area?
Can historical practice-based understandings of presidential power carry
legal status even if they are enforced by political means? What is the
significance, if any, of the fact that historical practice relating to presidential power is often invoked by government actors in legal terms? To
begin answering these and related questions, the next Part considers
more specifically what it means to say that the President is constrained by
law.
Of course, presidential power is not the only area in which there are
questions about the existence and extent of legal constraint. Somewhat
analogous issues are raised, for example, about the effect of international
law on the behavior of nation-states, in light of the general absence in the
65. See generally Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (First Mariner
Books 2004) (1973).
66. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and
the Subversion of American Democracy 9 (2007) (“The war on terrorism’s climate of
perpetual emergency provided a vehicle for turning [Vice-President Cheney’s] vision of an
unfettered commander in chief into a reality.”); Schlesinger, supra note 65, at xvii (“Once
again, international crisis has resurrected the Imperial Presidency.”); Frederick A.O.
Schwarz Jr. & Aziz Z. Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of
Terror 200 (2007) (“With an arrogance born of historical amnesia, the Bush
Administration invoked 9/11 to claim a power unprecedented on this side of the North
Atlantic to suspend or wholly circumvent laws passed by Congress barring torture,
detention without judicial review, and wiretapping without warrants.”).
67. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 23, 2012, at A1 (“[T]he Administration has been seeking ways to act without
Congress.”); Andrew Romano & Daniel Klaidman, President Obama’s Executive Power
Grab, Newsweek, Oct. 22, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/10/21/
president-obama-s-executive-power-grab.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(suggesting President Obama had shifted to unilateral action in face of congressional
obstruction).
68. See, e.g., John P. MacKenzie, The Appearance of Justice 225–26 (1974) (linking
increased public cynicism about national leaders to Watergate); James T. Patterson, Grand
Expectations 782 (1996) (noting broad public perception that “Watergate . . . proved . . .
the deviousness and arrogance of government officials who claimed to serve the public
interest”).
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international arena of both authoritative judicial review and formal
enforcement mechanisms.69 Nevertheless, as we discuss in Part III, at least
some of the potential legal constraints on presidential power reflect
specific characteristics of U.S. legal culture and executive branch
structure, and might not translate to other contexts. Therefore, while
some of this Essay’s conceptual analysis may be applicable to questions
about the constraining effect of law more generally, our focus here is
solely on presidential power.
II. UNPACKING THE IDEA OF LEGAL CONSTRAINT
To assess whether and how law, including practice-based law, might
constrain the President, we first need to understand what it means for
law to constrain. In this Part, therefore, we attempt to unpack the idea of
legal constraint. We start by distinguishing noncompliance with law from
reasonable disagreements about law. Next, we address the difficulty of
“observational equivalence,” whereby actions consistent with law may be
taken for nonlegal reasons, and whereby actions inconsistent with law
may occur even though law acted as a constraint. Finally, we explore
several relationships that affect law’s capacity to constrain: between law’s
role in constraining government action and its role in constituting (and
thus enabling) government, between law and enforcement, and between
law and judicial review.
A. Assessing Noncompliance
Before considering what it means to say that the President is constrained by law, it is important to note that it can be difficult to assess
whether particular presidential actions should count as legal compliance
or noncompliance. As an initial matter, we need some way to distinguish
noncompliance from genuine disagreement about what the law requires.
It is rare for Presidents to acknowledge that they are acting inconsistently
with the law. Instead, they typically argue that the law does not require
what critics are contending. In the war powers area, for example,
Presidents have long claimed that the Constitution grants them the
authority to use military force unilaterally, at least in certain
circumstances. The Obama Administration made that very claim
regarding the military operations in Libya in 2011.70 As that episode also
illustrates, presidential uses of force without congressional authorization
are never presented as exceeding legal boundaries, and critics’ cries of
69. Compare, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International
Law 13 (2005) (arguing international law “is not a check on state self-interest”), with Oona
A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law,
72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469 (2005) (emphasizing importance of informal enforcement
measures to operation of international law).
70. See Krass Memorandum, supra note 33.
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illegality are virtually always contested. Obviously, the greater the
indeterminacy of the law in question, the more likely it is that there will
be disputes over what the law provides. If the dispute is genuine and
reasonable, we do not think it makes sense to call the presidential action
at issue noncompliant with the law.
On issues of presidential power, the role of historical practice can
make it especially difficult to disentangle noncompliance with the law
from disagreement about the law. The challenges lie on two levels. First,
although historical practice is regularly invoked by courts and other
interpreters addressing issues of presidential power, some critics of presidential action might maintain that historical practice should not play
such a role. Originalist constitutional law scholars might insist, for
example, that the constitutional law of presidential power should be
based exclusively on the Founding generation’s understanding of the
constitutional text.71 Other scholars might object that, even if constitutional meaning is not fixed at the Founding, the historical gloss method
of constitutional interpretation is objectionable because it unduly favors
executive authority. These perspectives may lead to charges that
particular exercises of presidential power are unlawful even if supported
by what otherwise might be considered to be practice-based constitutional law. Of course, methodological disputes are common in constitutional law, so the problem is not unique to this topic. In any event, as
summarized in Part I and as detailed in our other work, historical
practice does in fact occupy a central role in debates about the constitutional law of presidential power.72 For purposes of this Essay, we assume
that it will continue to do so.
The second level is substantive: To the extent that constitutional
limits on presidential authority are informed by historical practice, on
any given issue one first needs to have a view about the relevant practice
before assessing whether the President has complied with the law. Thus,
for example, if one concludes that the best description of practiceinformed presidential power is that the President may use military force
unilaterally for small-scale operations with discrete objectives but not for
conflicts that are expected to require a substantial and protracted
commitment of ground troops, one might find general presidential
71. This is just one illustration of a larger point that disputes over the legality of a
given presidential action can involve not just disagreement about what a given set of legal
authorities provides, but also disagreement about what counts as a legitimate source of law
or legal meaning. Situations that might at first seem like legal noncompliance might be
better seen as involving disagreements of this sort—for example, a disagreement over the
extent to which moral or pragmatic considerations are part of the law. For a discussion of
the analytical difficulties that can arise when law is viewed as encompassing a broad range
of such considerations, see Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed 17 n.40 (Sept. 20,
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
72. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 417–24.
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compliance with the law in this area.73 But if one has a different view of
the practice-based constitutional law relevant to this issue, one may be
more inclined to see certain presidential uses of military force as
unlawful.74 As with methodological disagreement, this sort of dispute
about the relevant content of the law is not uncommon in other areas of
law. For purposes of this Essay, we do not take a position on the content
of practice-based constitutional law on specific issues. Instead, we simply
assume that it is at least sometimes possible to distinguish between
legitimate disagreement about the law and noncompliance with the law,
even on issues of presidential power for which the law is heavily
influenced by historical practice.
An additional complication arises when there are multiple sources of
law that potentially relate to the same presidential action. In that
situation, even if there is no dispute about the content of the underlying
law, Presidents may claim that the otherwise governing law has been
displaced by some other law. A statutory prohibition at Time 1, for
example, might arguably be displaced by a congressional authorization at
Time 2. Or a statutory restriction might arguably be unconstitutional,
perhaps because it invades some exclusive presidential prerogative.
Again, if presidential action is supported by a reasonable claim along
these lines, we do not think it makes sense to label it noncompliance.75
Of course, not all such claims will be reasonable, so the mere existence of
a claim will not resolve whether the action complies with law.
We recognize that the above references to the “reasonableness” (or
to “plausibility,” “debatability,” and so on) of various arguments
introduce added complications. Legal compliance can mean different
things in different contexts. In some circumstances, complying with the
law could mean adhering to a view that is ultimately deemed to be the
correct one. That orientation is common in circumstances subject to
final resolution by a single authoritative decisionmaker, like a court.76
But especially in areas not frequently subject to judicial review and more
heavily influenced by historical practice—that is, areas like the one we
focus on in this Essay—the orientation might more commonly focus on
73. See id. at 462–63.
74. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 33, at 18–19 (disputing OLC’s argument that past
practice supported legality of President Obama’s use of military force in Libya).
75. For the view that the President has the authority not to enforce laws that he deems
unconstitutional, see generally Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional
Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199 (1994). For the view that he has a duty not to enforce such
laws, see generally Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613 (2008).
76. It is not always how courts proceed, however. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (requiring judicial deference
under certain circumstances to reasonable interpretations of statutes by administrative
agencies charged with implementing them).
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legal reasonableness or plausibility. We do not attempt here to determine
precisely what these weaker forms of legal persuasiveness might entail, or
how they might differ among themselves. The key point is simply that
they involve a lower degree of legal certainty and thereby allow for a
broader range of discretion.
To be sure, some executive branch actors involved in assessing the
law of presidential power might themselves claim to focus on some
version of legal correctness. As noted above and discussed in greater
detail below, OLC is an example.77 But OLC is not a typical executive
legal office, and only a small fraction of all the legal questions arising
within the executive branch go to OLC. Moreover, whatever the orientation of the executive actor in question, relevant audiences (whether in
Congress, the press, or the informed public more generally) might be
more attuned to whether the President operates within the bounds of
legal reasonableness or plausibility than to whether he adheres to a
single “correct” view of the law. If nothing else, it seems likely that the
negative consequences to a President of appearing to exceed the
boundaries of what is plausible would be more severe than the negative
consequences of asserting a plausible but not ultimately persuasive view
of the law.
In situations where legal plausibility or some similar standard is the
touchstone, determining noncompliance can be especially difficult. If
the correct view of the practice-based law of presidential power is often
hard to discern, determining what views are reasonable on such matters
can be even more challenging. Such judgments will often (indeed,
perhaps always) be debatable. But that difficulty is not unique to this
topic; it is a feature of legal argumentation generally. In any event, the
fact that the legality of a particular presidential action may be debatable
does not mean that law cannot operate as a constraint in that context.78
Even if the President is advised that there is a minimally plausible argument in favor of the action in question, the law might still constrain him
not to act if the argument is perceived as being too weak. The relative perceived strength of a legal argument, in other words, might have a
constraining effect.79

77. See supra text accompanying note 32; infra text accompanying notes 127–130.
78. See Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 1006 (“From reasonable
and conscientious disagreement, one cannot infer the absence of normative constraint.”).
79. Whether this scenario involves “law” acting as a constraint will depend to some
extent on one’s definition of law. Under a Dworkinian conception of law, pursuant to
which there is a single best reading of the legal materials, a mere plausibility constraint
might not be a legal one. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 231 (1986) (suggesting
there will be best legal interpretation in terms of fit with prior legal materials and
principles). Even under that conception, however, one could reasonably describe the
plausibility constraint as “law-related.”
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Consider, for example, the confrontation that developed in the
summer of 2011 between the Obama Administration and Republican
leaders in Congress over whether to increase the statutory debt ceiling.
When a legislative extension appeared unlikely, some commentators
suggested, based on either novel constitutional arguments or pure policy
grounds, that the President could and should unilaterally exceed the
debt ceiling.80 Others insisted that such unilateral action would be
unconstitutional because it would usurp Congress’s constitutional
authority “[t]o borrow [m]oney on the credit of the United States.”81
Historical practice was potentially relevant to the issue in that, as noted
by Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, “[t]hroughout American history, the
debt ceiling always has been set and raised by statute, not executive
decision-making.”82 President Obama did not attempt to address the
issue unilaterally and instead continued to seek a legislative extension of
the ceiling, which he ultimately obtained. In explaining his decision,
Obama stated publicly that he had consulted with his lawyers about the
argument that he had the authority to extend the debt ceiling unilaterally, and noted that “[t]hey’re not persuaded that that is a winning
argument.”83

80. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Can Obama Extend the Debt Ceiling on His Own?,
N.Y. Rev. Books (July 29, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011
/jul/29/can-obama-extend-debt-ceiling-his-own/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(arguing President had authority based on provision in Fourteenth Amendment stating
that “[t]he validity of the public debt of the United States . . . shall not be questioned,”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Op-Ed., Obama Should
Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, N.Y. Times, July 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing
President had authority to raise debt ceiling based on “the necessities of state” and his
“role as the ultimate guardian of the constitutional order”); see also Neil H. Buchanan &
Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the
President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1205–14
(2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose] (arguing President has
constitutional duty to execute spending laws enacted by Congress, to collect tax revenues
pursuant to laws enacted by Congress, and to keep borrowing within limits specified in
debt ceiling statute, and contending that, when those duties come into conflict, least
unconstitutional (and hence most preferable) course of action is for President to honor
Congress’s wishes regarding spending and taxes by setting aside debt ceiling).
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., A Ceiling We
Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2011, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20
11/07/08/opinion/08tribe.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
82. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution, Obama and Raising the Debt Ceiling, L.A.
Times Opinion L.A. (July 29, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla
/2011/07/erwin-chemerinsky-on-why-obama-cant-raise-the-debt-ceiling.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
83. David Jackson, Obama Says He Can’t Raise Debt Ceiling on His Own, USA Today
The Oval (July 22, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval
/post/2011/07/obama-speaks-at-university-of-maryland/1#.UQBAoI6pVE8 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). Some accounts from former insiders accord with this account.
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When the debt ceiling issues returned in late 2012 and early 2013, a
similar scenario unfolded. Some commentators and Democrats in
Congress suggested a variety of legal arguments that Obama could invoke
in support of unilateral action.84 But the President appeared once again
to wave off these arguments, and executive branch officials cited legal
considerations in support of that decision.85

See, e.g., David Jarmul, Kind Words for Colleagues in Washington, Duke Today (July 14,
2012), http://today.duke.edu/2012/07/powelldc (quoting H. Jefferson Powell, after he
had served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General, as saying “the administration did not
embrace any of these magic fixes (I mean the sarcasm) and you might well assume that at
least part of the reason is that the administration’s lawyers told the policymakers that the
op-eds were not responsible legal arguments”).
84. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling
Threat Once and For All: Why the President Should Embrace the Least Unconstitutional
Option, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 237, 238 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org
/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/237_Buchanan_Dorf.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reiterating “least unconstitutional option” argument advanced in Buchanan &
Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 80, in context of late-2012 standoff); Carlos Mucha, OpEd., The Coin, N.Y. Times Room for Debate (Jan. 13, 2012, 7:22 PM), http://www
.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/13/proposing-the-unprecedented-to-avoid-default
/platinum-coin-would-create-a-trillion-dollar-in-funds (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing Treasury Secretary should direct United States Mint to produce “a
platinum numismastic [sic] coin with, say, a $1 trillion denomination,” which “can then be
deposited at the Federal Reserve, and the Fed will credit the account of the U.S.
government for the face value of the coin”); Eric Posner, The President Has the Power to
Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, Slate, Jan. 4, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles
/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/01/debt_ceiling_president_obama_has_th
e_power_to_raise_the_debt_limit_without.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(arguing “[w]here Congress fails to provide him with consistent instructions, [the
President] has the discretion to do what he believes is in the public interest,” including
undertaking “some combination of cutting spending, borrowing beyond the debt limit,
and perhaps even searching out new sources of revenue”); see also Jonathan Weisman,
“Any Lawful Steps” Urged To Avert Default, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2013, at A11, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/us/politics/democrats-urge-obama-to-take-any-law
ful-steps-to-avoid-default.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting letter from
Senate Democratic leadership to President Obama, saying if Congress fails to raise debt
ceiling, “we believe you must be willing to take any lawful steps to ensure that America
does not break its promises and trigger a global economic crisis—without Congressional
approval, if necessary”).
85. See, e.g., Ian Katz, Treasury, Fed Oppose Using Platinum Coin to Avoid Debt
Ceiling, Bloomberg Businessweek, Jan. 13, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2013-01-12/treasury-fed-oppose-using-platinum-coin-to-avoid-debt-limit (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (quoting Treasury Department spokesman as saying “[n]either the
Treasury Department nor the Federal Reserve believes that the law can or should be used
to facilitate the production of platinum coins for the purpose of avoiding an increase in
the debt limit”); Press Release, Press Sec’y Jay Carney, White House Press Briefing (Dec. 6,
2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/06/press-briefing-press-sec
retary-jay-carney-12062012 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]his administration
does not believe that the 14th Amendment gives the President the power to ignore the
debt ceiling—period.”).
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In light of the novelty of the issue, the conclusion of executive
branch lawyers that there was no “winning argument” might not have
reflected a belief that a unilateral extension of the debt ceiling was disallowed by a single correct view of the law. Instead, it is possible that they
acknowledged some uncertainty in this area but were still skeptical about
the unilateral authority arguments. That skepticism might have entailed
a conclusion that the arguments exceeded the boundaries of even mere
plausibility, or it might have entailed a judgment that the arguments,
though minimally plausible to some executive lawyers, risked exposing
the President to political sanctions from congressional or other
opponents who might reasonably characterize the state of the law
differently and claim that he had acted illegally. Either way, if the
perceived weakness of the arguments contributed to the President’s
decision not to attempt a unilateral extension, the law would have had a
constraining effect even though its precise contours were uncertain.86
To be sure, an administration determined to pursue a particular
agenda aggressively might treat bare plausibility as the only legal
constraint and also push the limits of plausibility beyond where others
would go. Some observers might see certain actions of the George W.
Bush Administration in the war on terror as examples of such an
approach.87 As a general matter, however, if in areas of legal uncertainty
the relative weakness of a legal argument makes it less likely that the
President will pursue the action in question, then uncertainty about the
correct view of the law would not, by itself, prevent the law from
operating as a constraint.88
86. The trillion-dollar platinum coin proposal, see Mucha, supra note 84, highlights
another complication relating to the constraining effect of law. It is possible that the
executive branch thought that the proposal was legally defensible but that it would not be
perceived that way by the public. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Priorities, N.Y. Times Room
for Debate (Jan. 13, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/
13/proposing-the-unprecedented-to-avoid-default/priortizing-debt-obligations-is-the-mostconstitutional-plan (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing platinum coin idea
as “technically legal but wildly unrealistic”). If so, the “law” that constrains might in some
instances not be the law as understood by legal experts.
87. See, e.g., Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, Wash. Post,
Dec. 30, 2005, at A1 (noting “the administration asked government lawyers to draw up new
rules and reinterpret old ones to approve” banned or discouraged activities and quoting
General Michael V. Hayden, then-Deputy Director of National Intelligence, as saying “[a]s
a professional, I’m troubled if I’m not using the full authority allowed by law”). Of course,
others will take the view that even under a standard of minimal plausibility, some of the
Bush Administration’s actions—like finding “waterboarding” not to violate the federal
anti-torture statute—went too far. That is in fact our view, but it is not central to the point
made in this Essay.
88. Separate from the uncertainties linked to the content of the law, a further
challenge to assessing noncompliance in this area is the possibility that, in some extreme
circumstances, Presidents might claim a prerogative to violate the law in pursuit of some
other overriding imperative. As Thomas Jefferson put it, “A strict observance of the written
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Finally, it is important to acknowledge the risk of tautology when
considering compliance with practice-based legal constraints. The more
the law is defined by actual governmental practice, the more the
behavior of government institutions will become definitionally
“compliant” with the law. The tautology here is analogous to President
Nixon’s infamous claim that “when the President does it, that means that
it is not illegal.”89 Significantly, however, this problem is not inevitable for
a practice-based approach to law. Many accounts of how historical
practice should inform the law of presidential power emphasize factors
like consistency over time and acquiescence by Congress—factors that
will not be present in all situations.90 As we have explained elsewhere, it
may also make sense in some contexts to impose requirements beyond
those reflected in current doctrine, such as bipartisan acceptance or
express congressional endorsement.91 In short, to say that historical
practice informs the law of presidential power is not to say that all
arguments based on purported practice necessarily prevail.
B. Defining Constraint
The mere fact that the President acts in accordance with law in
particular cases is not enough to show that law constrains the executive.
After all, the President might have taken the same action even if there
were no legal rule on point—for example, out of political self-interest or
laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of
necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher
obligation.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 12 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 418 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904). The idea is commonly
traced to John Locke. See John Locke, Second Treatise on Government § 160 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1980) (discussing “power to act according to discretion, for the public
good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it”). Yet this idea of
a “prerogative power” (which, in practice, is virtually never invoked) seems importantly
distinct from ordinary noncompliance with the law. As traditionally conceived, assertions
of the prerogative power entail openly acknowledging the unlawfulness of the action in
question and subjecting oneself to the ex post judgment of Congress and the people. See
David Gray Adler, The Framers and Executive Prerogative: A Constitutional and Historical
Rebuke, 42 Presidential Stud. Q. 376, 387 (2012) (explaining Jefferson “emphasize[d] that
an official who assumes the power to act illegally must seek exoneration from Congress”).
Given those and other unique properties of the prerogative power, an account of
noncompliance with the law probably should not include reasonable invocations of that
power.
89. Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina War,
N.Y. Times, May 20, 1977, at A16.
90. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 432 & n.86 (noting various accounts of
institutional acquiescence); see also Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the
Discipline of History, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 377, 410–16 (2011) (book review) (emphasizing
need for care in identifying circumstances under which historical practice should be
credited).
91. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 454–55.
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some sort of tacit coordination. If so, the alignment between presidential
action and law would simply be an instance of observational
equivalence.92 Conversely, violations of the law do not necessarily show
that law has no influence—it may just be that, in certain cases, the legal
constraint was outweighed by other considerations. So merely observing
presidential behavior and comparing that behavior to purported legal
rules is insufficient.
Instead, our contention is that law should be understood to operate
as a constraint on the President when it exerts some force on decisionmaking
because of its status as law. This definition does not require that law will
always be the deciding factor in motivating presidential behavior, but it
does require that law have the potential to be the deciding factor. By
contrast, if the legal status of a rule can never be the deciding factor in
motivating presidential action—if, for example, the rule is always subordinated to policy or political considerations when it conflicts with them—
then the rule does not operate as a constraint.
This test admittedly imposes a low burden. Law would count as a
constraint under this test even if it affected decisionmaking only in
situations in which nonlegal considerations were nearly balanced in favor
of and against the proposed action. If the law had an effect only in those
circumstances, it would obviously be a weak constraint at best.93 For
analytical purposes, however, we think it is important to distinguish between two issues: first, whether the presidency is constrained at all by law
(and, in particular, practice-based constitutional law), and, second, the
extent of such constraint. The principal focus of this Essay is on the first
question. We recognize that even if this first question is answered
affirmatively, the importance of law as a constraint will ultimately turn on
the answer to the second question. A complete answer to the second
question would require systematic empirical analysis that this Essay does
not attempt, although the Conclusion does suggest some potential
avenues for such analysis and research.
As discussed in Part III, the constraining effect of law could stem
from either internal or external considerations. Obviously, if an actor has
internalized the normative force of a legal rule, the rule is having an
effect. This is what is sometimes referred to as the “Hartian” perspective,
after the legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart.94 But even if an actor has not
internalized the rule, there is legal effect, we would contend, if sanctions
92. See Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1402
(2012) [hereinafter Pildes, Law and the President] (reviewing Posner & Vermeule, The
Executive Unbound, supra note 5).
93. See Frederick Schauer, The Political Risks (if Any) of Breaking the Law, 4 J. Legal
Analysis 83, 88 (2012) [hereinafter Schauer, Political Risks].
94. See Pildes, Law and the President, supra note 92, at 1404 n.69 (describing
Hartian perspective as “the classic account of law as a practice that is experienced as
normatively binding” (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994))).
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for noncompliance are affected by the norm’s legal status.95 Thus, law
can act as a constraint even if not internalized by the actor. That is, law
can constrain even what Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to as a “bad
man,” as long as the existence or strength of the relevant sanctions is tied
at least in part to the fact that the norm in question is a legal norm.96
In many situations it will be possible to identify multiple reasons why
the President took a given action. The existence of such mixed motives
should not be enough, we would contend, to defeat the existence of a
legal effect. It might often be the case, for example, that an action will be
taken for both legal and political reasons. The question is whether the
legal reasons are exercising any additional force beyond the political, not
whether the legal reasons are the only reasons for the action. Nor should
it defeat the existence of a legal effect if the sanctions themselves are
political in nature. As discussed further below, the type of the sanctions
should not matter. Instead, the issue should be whether the presence or
severity of a given sanction is affected by the fact that the norm in
question is understood (by those imposing the sanction) at least in part
as a legal norm.
If a given sanction operates entirely on the basis of nonlegal considerations, however, we would not count it as showing a legal effect. Most
informal sanctions are in a sense constituted by law—for example,
members of Congress, the media, and private individuals have speech
rights under the Constitution that allow them to criticize government
action, and individuals who meet certain legal requirements have the
right to vote against officials whose actions they dislike—but we do not
think it is useful to describe sanctions as legal constraints merely because
they are constituted by law in this fashion. By collapsing the traditional
distinction between law and politics, such an approach would render the
question whether the President is constrained by law uninteresting, since
no one contends that the President is unconstrained by politics. Instead,
we would suggest that it is more fruitful to ask whether the sanction at
issue is not simply made possible by law in the constitutive sense, but also
responsive, at least in part, to the legal status of the underlying norm it is
enforcing.

95. But see Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 981 (describing
perspective under which “it is only as refracted through individual minds and consciences
that legal norms can be motivationally efficacious”).
96. See Pildes, Law and the President, supra note 92, at 1392–93 (“[T]he premise . . .
is that public officials obey the law not for normative reasons but only when the benefits of
legal compliance in specific contexts outweigh the costs.”); see also Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you want to know the
law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds
. . . reasons for conduct . . . in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”).
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None of this is to suggest, of course, that law and politics are completely separate, and in fact one of the central themes of this Essay is that
the two are frequently intertwined. Among other things, law and politics
often act in tandem either in support of, or in opposition to, presidential
action. The point here is simply that it is important to think beyond the
purely political aspect of sanctions.
C. Enabling and Constraining
Another framing question relates to the fact that law can play dual
roles. Law not only constrains government but also constitutes and
enables it. For example, a person can claim presidential authority in the
United States in part by showing that he or she has complied with certain
legal requirements for assuming the presidency. In that fundamental
sense, law enables presidential action by legitimizing assertions of
authority by those who satisfy its requirements. Inherently, these
enabling rules also act as constraints: Individuals cannot claim
presidential authority without complying with them. Constraints of this
sort are often taken for granted, perhaps because they are so clearly tied
to specific constitutional text and uniform historical practice that no one
seriously contemplates flouting them. Individuals under the age of thirtyfive do not attempt to run for President, and Presidents (since the
Twenty-Second Amendment) do not attempt to serve more than two
terms in office. In short, law inherently both empowers and constrains
presidential action.97 For that reason it is likely impossible to determine
whether the President is more constrained or enabled by the law in a
general sense, because the President depends on the law for his very
existence within our constitutional system.98 There is thus no realistic
counterfactual against which to make the comparison.
Relatedly, it may not be possible to say with confidence whether particular law-focused entities within the executive branch have a
constraining or enabling effect on the President overall. Consider OLC,
for example. OLC’s reputation for reasonably independent, detached
97. See Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 979 (“To be a president or
a member of Congress or a justice of the Supreme Court is to serve in an institution that is
constituted and empowered by the Constitution and, as a result, necessarily constrained by
it.”); Levinson, Parchment, supra note 14, at 711 (“[L]egal regimes are capable of
constraining powerful political actors because they are also, and even more so, enabling for
these actors.”).
98. See, e.g., Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 979 (“As both a
conceptual and a practical matter, the alternative to constrained presidents, congressmen,
and justices is not unconstrained officials, but rather no presidents, congressmen, or
justices at all.”); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 64, at 1838 (“There is no sense in
assessing the effect of constitutional law by contrast to what the President would do ‘in the
absence of constitutional law,’ since neither the President nor his capability to do anything
would exist at all without constitutional law.”).
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legal analysis gives its work special weight. But there is no constitutional
requirement that OLC even exist, and the President could in theory
choose not to seek OLC’s legal advice on any given question.99 Thus, the
fact that OLC does exist—and that Presidents regularly seek its advice on
high-profile legal questions—may suggest that, on balance, OLC
enhances the overall ability of Presidents to take their preferred actions.
The mechanism for that enhancement is that, when embarking upon a
controversial course of action, the President is in a better position to
defend the action’s legality if he can point to an OLC opinion upholding
it.100 Contrary to what some scholars could be read to suggest,101 however,
99. See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Libyan Legal Limbo: Why There’s Nothing
Wrong with Obama Ignoring Some of His Own Legal Advisers on Libya, Slate, July 5, 2011,
, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/06/libyan_legal_
limbo.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“A president need not have or consult
any legal advisers at all; nothing prevents Obama from shutting down OLC and the other
executive branch legal offices altogether and deciding the administration’s legal positions
for himself.”). Professors Posner and Vermeule go too far in saying that “nothing prevents
Obama from shutting down OLC.” A combination of statutory and regulatory provisions
provides for OLC’s existence. See 28 U.S.C. § 506 (2006) (“The President shall appoint, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 11 Assistant Attorneys General, who shall
assist the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2012)
(listing matters assigned to OLC, including “[p]reparing the formal opinions of the
Attorney General; rendering informal opinions and legal advice to the various agencies of
the Government; and assisting the Attorney General in the performance of his functions
as legal adviser to the President and as a member of, and legal adviser to, the Cabinet”). In
light of these provisions and OLC’s well-established history, Congress (and especially the
Senate Judiciary Committee, which oversees the Department of Justice) surely expects that
OLC will continue to exist. A presidential decision to shut down OLC would likely provoke
substantial congressional backlash. Moreover, dismantling OLC would return its legal
advisory function to the Attorney General, in whom such authority has been vested by
statute ever since the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat.
73, 92–93 (creating office of Attorney General of United States and assigning to it certain
responsibilities, including giving “advice and opinion upon questions of law when
required by the President . . . or when requested by the heads of any of the departments,
touching any matters that may concern their departments”). That function is now codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–513. The President of course is not obliged to follow the Attorney
General’s legal advice, but it would be practically impossible for him to shut down that
office.
100. See Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and
the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. F. 62, 64 (2011),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124_forum_morrison.pdf [hereinafter
Morrison, Libya] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[S]ignaling and maintaining a
willingness to treat OLC’s legal advice as presumptively binding enhances the credibility of
a president’s claims of good faith and respect for the law, which in turn can help generate
public support for his actions.”).
101. See, e.g., Ackerman, Decline, supra note 5, at 106 (characterizing OLC as “a
legal apologist for presidential power”); Eric A. Posner, Deference to the Executive in the
United States After September 11: Congress, the Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel,
35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 213, 228–29 (2012) [hereinafter Posner, Deference to the
Executive] (“The OLC does not constrain the executive but enables him to accomplish
goals that he would not otherwise be able to accomplish.”).
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this does not establish that OLC invariably enhances presidential power.
An OLC opinion affirming the President’s policies may be fairly said to
empower him on that issue. But OLC does not always say yes,102 and the
absence of an OLC opinion in the President’s favor likely makes it more
difficult for him to pursue that course of action than if there were no
OLC at all.103 Whether that amounts to an overall restriction or enhancement of presidential power may be impossible to judge.
More fundamentally, the mere fact that law in general—and certain
legal offices like OLC in particular—both enable and constrain
presidential action in an aggregate sense does not speak in any meaningful way to whether law constrains the President in specific exercises of his
authority. The latter question, we believe, is what most people have in
mind when considering whether law constrains the President, and it is
the focus of this Essay. That is, we ask whether, when the President takes
a particular action, the law acts as a constraint. But it is also worth
emphasizing that the ability of legal argumentation to enable presidential authority at the wholesale level may itself corroborate the possibility
of legal constraint at the retail level. If all law relating to presidential
authority were merely epiphenomenal, it is not clear why legal
argumentation would have any capacity to enhance such authority.104
D. Relationship Between Law and Enforcement
One of the grounds of skepticism about whether the presidency is
constrained by law concerns the frequent lack of formal enforcement
mechanisms. There is an extensive jurisprudential literature on whether
and to what extent enforcement is necessary in order for norms to
qualify as law.105 Modern perspectives on law, in the tradition of H.L.A.
Hart, tend to de-emphasize the importance of external enforcement and
focus instead on internal perceptions, a point we return to in Part III. For
present purposes, we simply note two things. First, a norm need not be
perfectly enforced in order to constrain. Of course, as the legal realists
emphasized, one cannot get an accurate picture of the law by looking

102. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1715–21 (finding
significant number of opinions “predominantly against the White House”).
103. See Morrison, Libya, supra note 100, at 69–70 (discussing costs to presidential
credibility of regularly departing from OLC’s analysis, and of failing to seek OLC’s
opinion on issues that would ordinarily go to OLC).
104. Cf. Posner, Deference to the Executive, supra note 101, at 230 (suggesting OLC
enables exercise of executive power by “convey[ing] information to the President about
the constraints on executive power that are imposed from outside the executive branch”).
105. See generally Joshua Kleinfeld, Enforcement and the Concept of Law, 121 Yale
L.J. Online 293 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1029.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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only at the law on the books rather than the law in action.106 Our point
here, however, is simply that the lack of perfect enforcement of a legal rule
does not mean the rule does not exist, or that it does not constrain. The
fact that homicides continue to be committed in the United States—and
that not everyone who commits such a crime is apprehended and
prosecuted—does not remove or render meaningless the legal prohibition against homicide.
Second, enforcement need not be formal. Domestic criminal laws, of
course, are typically implemented through a range of formal
enforcement mechanisms, such as state-sanctioned incarceration. Even
such formal modes of enforcement, however, are probably enhanced by
informal mechanisms such as public shaming and exclusion. For
example, the formal punishment-based deterrence against committing
an offense like embezzlement is likely enhanced by a desire to avoid
public embarrassment and a worry about the difficulty of obtaining
future employment.107
Even when the likely enforcement mechanisms are entirely informal,
we think they should count for purposes of evaluating whether law
operates as a constraint. For some issues of presidential power, there are
very few potential modes of formal enforcement (impeachment may be
the only formal mode), and the likelihood that they would be employed
to sanction any particular presidential act is generally very low. But there
may still be enforcement through informal mechanisms such as congressional backlash and public disapproval. If those enforcement measures
are triggered or intensified at least in part by the legal status of a norm,
then we believe one can meaningfully describe them as a type of legal
enforcement. On this point it is worth noting that, outside of the area of
constitutional law, it is generally accepted that law can act as a constraint
even when it takes the form of customary norms, and even when it is
subject primarily to informal enforcement. There is a rich literature, for
example, on the customary “law merchant” in medieval Europe, the
enforcement of which was based heavily on reputation.108 Gillian
Hadfield and Barry Weingast have recently supplemented that literature
with modeling that shows how legal norms in general can be effective
106. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1222 (1931) (noting “some rules [are] mere paper”).
107. See generally John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration 101–02 (1989)
(noting that individuals “having high employment and educational aspirations” are
particularly vulnerable to stigma of illegality); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green,
Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior,
71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 325 (1980).
108. E.g., Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons
from Medieval Trade (2006); Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom & Barry R. Weingast,
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J.
Pol. Econ. 745 (1994).
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even in the absence of centralized enforcement.109 As applied to
presidential power, this analysis suggests, once again, that the interrelationship of law and politics does not by itself negate the importance
of law.
E. Relevance of Judicial Review
As the discussion of enforcement should make clear, we do not
believe that judicial review is a prerequisite to concluding that law,
including practice-based constitutional law relating to presidential
power, operates as a legal constraint. In this respect, we depart from
some understandings of British (and, more broadly, Commonwealth)
constitutional law. Britain has an unwritten constitution, and British
commentators—most famously, A.V. Dicey—have distinguished between
constitutional law and “constitutional conventions” largely on the basis of
judicial enforceability.110 On Dicey’s account, British constitutional law
includes only judicially enforceable rules, while constitutional
conventions “consist of conventions, understandings, habits, or practices
which . . . regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign
power . . . [but] are not in reality laws at all since they are not enforced
by the Courts.”111 As depicted by Dicey, the substantive domain of
constitutional conventions overlaps substantially with that of the practicebased norms with which this Essay is concerned. For several reasons,
however, we do not think that this similarity precludes calling those
norms “law.”
First, in denying the label “law” to constitutional conventions, Dicey
was not relegating them to an undifferentiated realm of mere politics.
Instead, he was identifying a set of practices fairly described as constitutional in nature, which could be thought to carry a special normative
force because of their constitutional status even though they were not
legally enforceable in the courts. Second, Dicey developed his account
against the background of an Austinian conception of law that viewed
formal sanctions as a crucial element of law, a conception that has been
substantially disputed by modern legal theorists, most notably H.L.A.
Hart.112 To the extent that the Austinian conception holds less sway
today, there is less need to draw a sharp distinction between law and conventions. Third, it is worth noting that not all modern Commonwealth
109. Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Law Without the State: Legal Attributes
and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment, 1 J.L. & Courts 3 (2013);
Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What is Law? A Coordination Model of the
Characteristics of Legal Order, 4 J. Legal Analysis 471 (2012).
110. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution ch. 14 (3d
ed., London, MacMillan & Co. 1889).
111. Id. at 24.
112. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law ch. 3 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
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legal theorists embrace that sharp distinction.113 Of particular significance here, many scholars today suggest that conventions can play a
limited role in litigated controversies and thus are not strictly extrajudicial.114 Finally, whatever the proper label in Britain or other
Commonwealth countries, in the U.S. context the notion that constitutional law is not law unless it is judicially enforceable does not fit with the
political question and other nonjusticiability doctrines, which readily
accept that constitutional law extends beyond what the courts do.115
To better accord with understandings of U.S. law, it may be useful to
distinguish between constitutional conventions that have a legally
normative character and those that do not, regardless of whether they
are subject to judicial review.116 Under this conception, what makes a
convention nonlegal is not simply the unwillingness of courts to enforce
it. Rather, it is that members of the relevant community do not understand its breach to be a violation of the law, even if they understand it to
be improper behavior. So, for example, a violation of the convention of
senatorial courtesy for judicial appointments, or perhaps even of the preTwenty-Second Amendment convention against Presidents serving more
than two terms, might be viewed as normatively improper but not
necessarily unconstitutional. Whether the convention qualified as law, in

113. See, e.g., Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution 74 (5th ed. 1959)
(arguing conventions “are rules whose nature does not differ fundamentally from that of
the positive law of England”); see also Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The
Rules and Forms of Political Accountability 12–13 (1984) (discussing this issue).
114. See, e.g., N.W. Barber, The Constitutional State 90 (2011); Marshall, supra note
113, at 13–17. As Adrian Vermeule describes, “[C]ourts may not directly enforce
conventions against other political actors, in the sense that courts may not invoke
freestanding conventions to override written legal rules. However, courts may indirectly
recognize and incorporate conventions in the course of performing their . . . duty of
interpreting written laws or rules of common law.” Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of
Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming June 2013) (manuscript at 15)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
115. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Government officials must make a conscious decision to obey
the Constitution whether or not their acts can be challenged in a court of law and then
must conform their actions to these principled determinations.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“The issue [before the Court] is not whether
severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to
say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”). Nor does limiting the
category of constitutional law to that which is enforced by the courts accord with the
scholarly emphasis in recent years on constitutional law outside the courts. E.g., Larry D.
Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004);
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts ch. 1 (1999).
116. Other scholars who have focused on U.S. constitutional conventions have not
taken account of this potential distinction. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, America’s
Unwritten Constitution ch. 9 (2012); Herbert W. Horwill, The Usages of the American
Constitution ch. 12 (1925).
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other words, would depend on whether the convention met certain
accepted rules of recognition.117
To be sure, it may be difficult to distinguish between legally
normative conventions and other normative conventions, since the
courts may not enforce either one, and the informal sanctions for their
breach may be similar. Presumably, however, debates about alleged
breaches of legally normative conventions will be surrounded by analysis
couched in legal terms, whereas debates about potential breaches of
other conventions will not. Relatedly, if the convention is understood as
legal in character, then within the executive branch it is likely that
lawyers will play a fairly important role in interpreting and applying it.
The legal quality of the norm, in other words, may be reflected in the
identity of the personnel with primary responsibility for analyzing and
implementing it. The identity of the personnel could in turn affect the
likelihood of constraints, as discussed below in Part III. Moreover,
because they are based on evolving practice, the status of conventions is
likely not fixed, and thus some nonlegal conventions presumably could
evolve into legal norms, and, conversely, some conventions understood
as legal might lose that character over time. The key point is that the
distinction would not turn on the existence or nonexistence of judicial
review.
Insisting on a sharp distinction between the law governing presidential authority that is subject to judicial review and the law that is not also
takes for granted a phenomenon that merits attention—that Presidents
follow judicial decisions.118 That assumption is generally accurate in the
United States today. To take one relatively recent example, despite disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s determination in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the war on
terror, the Bush Administration quickly accepted it.119 But the reason why
Presidents abide by court decisions has a connection to the broader issue
117. H.L.A. Hart famously argued that legal systems depend on having shared “rules
of recognition” for determining which norms are legally binding. Under this view, “custom
is law only if it is one of a class of customs which is ‘recognized’ as law by a particular legal
system.” Hart, supra note 112, at 44–45. See generally The Rule of Recognition and the
U.S. Constitution (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (considering
application of rule of recognition to U.S. constitutional law).
118. See Roger Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1130,
1132 (1961) (“Whether or not governments are theoretically capable of legal limitation,
they do regularly submit to adverse court decisions.”); Levinson, Parchment, supra note
14, at 661 (“Casting courts as constitutional enforcers merely pushes the question back to
why powerful political actors are willing to pay attention to what judges say; why ‘people
with money and guns ever submit to people armed only with gavels.’” (quoting Matthew C.
Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . ”: The Political Foundations of Independent
Judicial Review, 32 J. Legal Stud. 59, 60 (2003))).
119. See Mark Mazzeti & Kate Zernike, White House Says Terror Detainees Hold
Basic Rights, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2006, at A1.
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of the constraining effect of law. An executive obligation to comply with
judicial decisions is itself part of the practice-based constitutional law of the
United States, so presidential compliance with this obligation may
demonstrate that such law can in fact constrain the President. This is
true, as we explain further in Part III, even if the effect on presidential
behavior is motivated by concerns about external political perceptions
rather than an internal sense of fidelity to law (or judicial review).120
A final complication is that, with respect to issues of presidential
power, there are few situations in which the prospect of judicial review is
actually zero. If the Supreme Court can decide Bush v. Gore121 and the war
on terror cases, it can decide a lot.122 Areas of presidential power that
typically see little judicial involvement might become areas of greater
involvement under certain conditions. Moreover, the likelihood of
judicial review is probably affected by the extent to which courts perceive
the President to be stretching traditional legal understandings. As a
result, it might be more accurate to describe the constitutional law of
presidential power as judicially underenforced, rather than unenforceable. Even outside the separation of powers area, there is an extensive
literature on the legal status of underenforced constitutional norms. For
a variety of reasons, including justiciability limitations, immunity
doctrines, and judicial deference to coordinate institutions, it has long
been understood that the Constitution is not fully enforced by the courts.
Nevertheless, courts and scholars commonly accept that judicially
underenforced constitutional norms retain the status of law beyond the
extent of judicial enforcement.123

120. Cf. Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 1018 (“[I]f we ask why
elected officials . . . accede so readily to claims of judicial authority . . . , part of the answer
can be traced to the external constraint that public expectations impose. . . . [T]he public
has been socialized to believe that judicial interpretations are legally binding.”).
121. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
122. The Supreme Court also recently signaled a narrow view of the political
question doctrine, even in the area of foreign affairs. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (describing political question doctrine as “narrow
exception” to judiciary’s “responsibility to decide cases properly before it”).
123. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1274, 1299 (2006); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212,
1221 (1978); see also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 137–38 (1893) (observing “much which is harmful
and unconstitutional may take effect without any capacity in the courts to prevent it, since
their whole power is a judicial one”). But cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857, 904–05 (1999) (emphasizing connection
between constitutional rights and remedial substantiation, while noting “[p]erhaps . . .
constitutional rights may have an effect on government behavior independent of formal,
state-imposed sanctions for noncompliance”).
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III. POSSIBLE MECHANISMS OF CONSTRAINT
Having specified in the previous Part what counts as legal constraint
in our view, this Part considers how legal constraints might work with
respect to the presidency. It first examines two familiar potential
mechanisms of constraint: the internalization of legal norms by relevant
actors within the executive branch and the threat of external sanctions
for violating those norms. This Part then discusses the implications of an
obvious but less-discussed phenomenon—the fact that executive officials
frequently engage in public dialogue about the President’s constitutional
authority, including his practice-based authority. It concludes by
analyzing the debate over the military intervention in Libya, mentioned
earlier, in order to highlight some of the challenges associated with
empirically studying the ways in which the presidency may be constrained
by law.
A. Norm Internalization
Perhaps the most obvious way that law can have a constraining effect
is if the relevant actors have internalized the legal norms, whether those
norms are embodied in authoritative text, judicial decisions, or
institutional practice. As a general matter, the internalization of legal
norms is a phenomenon that can potentially take place wherever the law
is thought to operate, in both the private and public sectors. But
precisely how that internalization operates, including how it affects actual
conduct, depends heavily on institutional context. When speaking of
legal norm internalization as it relates to the presidency, it is important
first to note that Presidents act through a wide array of agencies and
departments, and that presidential decisions are informed—and often
made, for all practical purposes—by officials other than the President. In
most instances involving presidential power, therefore, the relevant
question is whether there has been an internalization of legal norms by
the executive branch.
The executive branch contains thousands of lawyers.124 The
President and other executive officials are regularly advised by these
lawyers, and sometimes they themselves are lawyers. Although lawyers
serve in a wide variety of roles throughout the executive branch, their
124. Estimates of the number of lawyers working in federal government vary. See,
e.g., David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 21, 21 (2012),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol126_fontana.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“Every business day approximately 20,000 lawyers head to their jobs
in the federal government.”); Erin Delmore & Marisa M. Kashino, How Many Lawyers Are
There?, Washingtonian, Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/
how-many-lawyers-are-there (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating, in late 2009,
Office of Personnel Management reported “the number of practicing lawyers in all
executive departments and agencies across the country [was] 31,797”).
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experience of attending law school means that they have all had a
common socialization—a socialization that typically entails taking law
seriously on its own terms.125 Moreover, the law schools attended by
virtually all U.S. government lawyers are American law schools, which
means that the lawyers are socialized in an ethos associated with the
American polity and the American style of law and government.126 These
lawyers are also part of a professional community (including the state
bars to which they are admitted) with at least a loosely shared set of
norms of argumentative plausibility.
Certain legal offices within the executive branch have developed
their own distinctive law-internalizing practices. This is particularly true
in places like OLC, which, as noted above, provides legal advice based on
its best view of the law. OLC has developed a range of practices and
traditions—including a strong norm of adhering to its own precedents
even across administrations—that help give it some distance and relative
independence from the immediate political and policy preferences of its
clients across the executive branch, and that make it easier for OLC to
act on its own internalization of legal norms.127 Another example is the
State Department Legal Adviser’s Office, which often takes the lead
within the executive branch on matters of international law and which
has developed its own set of traditions and practices that help protect it
from undue pressure from its clients.128
More broadly, government legal offices may internalize legal norms
even if they do not regularly focus on identifying the best view of the law.
For example, an office committed not to seeking the best view of the law
but to providing professionally responsible legal defenses of certain
already-determined policy positions could still operate under legal
constraints if it took the limits of professional responsibility seriously.
125. See Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 777, 827 (2012) (reviewing Posner & Vermeule, The Executive Unbound, supra note
5) (“[L]awyers trained in this [legal] tradition currently staff the length and breadth of
the executive branch.”).
126. This socialization includes exposure to legal ethics, which all ABA-accredited law
schools are required to teach. See Am. Bar Assoc., 2012–2013 ABA Standards and Rules of
Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, Standard 302(a)(5) & Interpretation 302-9
(2012).
127. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel,
110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448 (2010). But see Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of
the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676, 728 (2005) (questioning
ability of Office of Solicitor General and OLC to constrain presidential decisionmaking in
absence of likelihood of judicial review).
128. See Fontana, supra note 124, at 45 (suggesting Legal Adviser’s Office, like OLC,
has “legitimacy created by long-standing tradition”); Harold Hongju Koh, The State
Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 Geo. L.J. 1747,
1749 (2012) (contending “a rich set of traditions, customs, expectations, and norms . . .
together ensure [the Legal Adviser’s Office’s] quality, integrity, and relevance”).
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That may well describe the typical posture of agency general counsel
offices across the executive branch. As noted above, although it can be
difficult to identify with consistent precision the outer boundaries of
legal plausibility, a commitment to remaining within those boundaries is
a commitment to a type of legal constraint.
If executive branch legal offices operate on the basis of certain
internalized norms that treat law as a constraint, the next question is
whether those offices have any effect on the actual conduct of the
executive branch. In the case of OLC, there are two key points. First,
although OLC possesses virtually no “mandatory” jurisdiction, there is a
general expectation that, outside the litigation context, legal questions of
special complexity, controversy, or importance will be put to OLC to
address.129 Second, established traditions treat OLC’s legal conclusions as
presumptively binding within the executive branch, unless overruled by
the Attorney General or the President (which happens extremely
rarely).130 Combined, these practices make OLC the most significant
source of centralized legal advice within the Executive Branch.
Still, OLC addresses only a very small fraction of all the legal
questions that arise within the executive branch, and a complete picture
of the extent to which executive officials internalize legal norms (or are
affected by others who internalize such norms) must extend well beyond

129. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1733 (suggesting
issues that should go to OLC include “(1) legal issues that OLC has a history of addressing
and on which it therefore has an accumulated jurisprudence and expertise; (2) significant
issues of executive power; and (3) programs or policies likely to trigger substantial public
attention and/or controversy”); Memorandum from Walter E. Dellinger et al., Principles
to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. 21, 2004), reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen,
Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L.
Rev. 1559 app. 2 at 1610 (2007) [hereinafter Dellinger Memorandum] (stating OLC
should be consulted “on all major executive branch initiatives and activities that raise
significant legal questions”).
130. See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Att’ys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice,
Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 1 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter
2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olclegal-advice-opinions.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating OLC “provide[s]
controlling advice to Executive Branch officials on questions of law”); Memorandum from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
Att’ys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Best Practices for OLC Opinions 1 (May 16, 2005)
[hereinafter 2005 OLC Best Practices Memorandum], available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/olc/best-practices.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[S]ubject
to the President’s authority under the Constitution, OLC opinions are controlling on
questions of law within the Executive Branch.”); Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 129,
at 1603 (“OLC’s legal determinations are considered binding on the executive branch,
subject to the supervision of the Attorney General and the ultimate authority of the
President.”).
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that office.131 Looking across the executive branch more broadly, there
may be a practical imperative driving at least some measure of legal norm
internalization. The executive branch is a vast bureaucracy, or series of
bureaucracies. Executive officials responsible for discharging the government’s various policy mandates cannot act effectively without a basic
understanding of who is responsible for what, and how government
power is to be exercised—all topics regulated by law, including practicebased law.132 Some of the understandings produced by those allocations
are probably so internalized that the relevant actors cannot even imagine
(at least in any serious way) a different regime.133
Even on the more high-profile policy questions that receive the
attention of the White House itself, the internalization of law may have a
constraining effect. There are lawyers in the White House, of course,
including the Office of Counsel to the President (otherwise known as the
White House Counsel’s Office). Some commentators—most notably
Bruce Ackerman, as part of his general claim that the executive branch
tends toward illegality—have characterized that office as populated by
“superloyalists” who face “an overwhelming incentive to tell [the
President] that the law allows [him] to do whatever [he] want[s] to
do.”134 If that were an accurate portrayal, it would suggest that there is
little to no internalization of the law in the White House Counsel’s
Office. But there are serious descriptive deficiencies in that account.135
131. As David Fontana has noted, “[O]n many issues, civil service lawyers are
functionally and/or formally the final actor in the executive branch,” and “even when a
legal issue does reach the political lawyers, it usually arrives on their desk after civil service
lawyers have already framed the issue in important ways, and it is difficult to diverge from
these civil service framings.” Fontana, supra note 124, at 42.
132. See Pildes, Law and the President, supra note 92, at 1407 (observing that, as
matter of “internal organizational efficacy, as well as effective cooperation with other parts
of the government, law serves an essential coordination function”).
133. For a general discussion of how law can affect what people take for granted and
how they understand their potential actions, see Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest:
Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997
Wis. L. Rev. 475.
134. Ackerman, Decline, supra note 5, at 12, 176.
135. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1731–41. Among other
things, Ackerman’s account misses the fact that in some areas—executive privilege, for
example—the White House Counsel’s concern for protecting the constitutional
prerogatives of the office of the presidency can lead it to advise the President to assert his
authority more robustly than he deems desirable as a political matter. See Maryanne
Borrelli et al., The White House Counsel’s Office, 31 Presidential Stud. Q. 561, 562 (2001)
(quoting A.B. Culvahouse, former White House Counsel under President Reagan, as
saying Counsel is “the last and in some cases the only protector of the president’s
constitutional privileges,” and “[a]lmost everyone else is willing to give those away . . . inch
by inch . . . to win the issue of the day, to achieve compromise”). In this way, politics does
not always push in the direction of violating legal limits on presidential power. The
relationship between law and politics in the White House and elsewhere is more
complicated than that.
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Still, the White House Counsel’s immediate proximity to and close
working relationship with the President and his senior political advisors
surely do cause politics to suffuse much of the work of that office in a way
that is not true of all of the executive branch.
The more fundamental point, however, is that it is in the nature of
modern government that the President’s power to act often depends at
least in part on the input and actions of offices and departments outside
the White House. That commonly includes the input of legal offices from
elsewhere across the executive branch.136 Many of those offices are
headed by political appointees, and thus politics are not likely to be
wholly absent from their work either. But many of those offices are also
populated primarily by nonpolitical “career” civil servants, whose work as
government lawyers across presidential administrations likely increases
the internalization of relevant legal norms. To the extent that the input
and actions of such offices affect the President’s ability to act, he may be
constrained by law without regard to whether he or his most senior
White House advisers think about the law.
Internalization of legal norms may at least partially explain the nowfamous standoff during the George W. Bush Administration between
high-ranking lawyers in the Justice Department and various White House
officials over the legality of a then-secret warrantless surveillance
program. The program was deeply important to the White House, but
the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and head of OLC all
refused to certify the legality of the program unless certain changes were
made. When the White House threatened to proceed with the program
without certification from the Justice Department, the leaders of the
Department (along with the Director of the FBI and others) all prepared
to resign. Ultimately, the White House backed down and acceded to the
changes.137 Some substantial part of the explanation for why the Justice
Department officials acted as they did seems to lie in their internalization
of a set of institutional norms that not only takes law seriously as a
constraint, but that insists on a degree of independence in determining
136. For a discussion of the reasons why the White House does not routinely rely on
the legal advice of the White House Counsel’s Office on questions that will ordinarily go to
OLC—and why it is not in the interests of the White House to do so—see Morrison,
Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1741–42; Morrison, Libya, supra note 100, at
63–64, 70–74.
137. This episode, including a standoff between White House and Justice
Department officials at Attorney General John Ashcroft’s hospital bedside, was recounted
in subsequent congressional testimony by James Comey, who had been Deputy Attorney
General at the time of the incident. See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the
Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 213–20 (2007) (statement of James B.
Comey, former Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States). For further discussion of the
confrontation between the Justice Department and the White House on this issue, see
Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency 286–320 (2008).
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what the law requires.138 Buckling under pressure from the White House
was evidently inconsistent with the Justice Department officials’ understanding of their professional roles.
B. External Sanctions
In addition to the constraining influence arising from the internalization of legal norms by executive branch lawyers and other officials, law
could constrain the President if there are “external” sanctions for
violating it. The core idea here is a familiar one, often associated with
Holmes’s “bad man”139: One who obeys the law only because he
concludes that the cost of noncompliance exceeds the benefits is still
subject to legal constraint if the cost of noncompliance is affected by the
legal status of the norm. This is true even though the law is likely to
impose less of a constraint on such “bad men” than on those who have
internalized legal norms, and even though it is likely to be difficult in
practice to disentangle internal and external constraints.
Importantly, external sanctions for noncompliance need not be
formal. If the existence or intensity of an informal sanction is affected by
the legal status of the norm in question, compliance with the norm in
order to avoid the sanction should be understood as an instance of law
having a constraining effect. In the context of presidential compliance
with the law, one can plausibly posit a number of such informal
sanctions. One operates on the level of professional reputation, and may
be especially salient for lawyers in the executive branch. If a lawyer’s own
internalization of the relevant set of legal norms is insufficient to prevent
him from defending as lawful actions that he knows are obviously beyond
the pale, he might respond differently if he believed his legal analysis
would or could be disclosed to the broader legal community in a way that
would threaten his reputation and professional prospects after he leaves
government.140 (This concern might help further explain the OLC and

138. For example, Barton Gellman has reported a conversation between President
Bush and Acting Attorney General James Comey, where President Bush said to Comey, “I
decide what the law is for the executive branch,” to which Comey replied, “That’s
absolutely true, sir, you do. But I decide what the Department of Justice can certify to and
can’t certify to, and despite my absolute best efforts I simply cannot in the circumstances.”
Gellman, supra note 137, at 318.
139. See Holmes, supra note 96, at 459; see also supra notes 95–96 and
accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend,
112 Colum. L. Rev. 507, 546 (2012) (“Attorneys in the OLC, both careerists and their
political supervisors, wish to maintain the OLC’s reputation as being above politics, in
part, because their future career prospects are tied to it.”); Morrison, Constitutional
Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1725 (“Disclosing OLC’s work implicates its lawyers’
professional reputations, which in turn encourages them to avoid behavior that would cast
them in a bad light.”).
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other Justice Department officials’ resistance to the White House in the
warrantless surveillance example discussed above.)
Although fear of harm to their professional reputations may indeed
help constrain government lawyers, if that were the only operative
external sanction in this context it would be fair to ask whether it
translated into a real constraint on the President in high-stakes contexts.
But it is not the only potential sanction. A related and perhaps more
significant sanction may operate directly on political leaders within the
government, including the President himself: partisan politics. If being
perceived to act lawlessly is politically costly, a President’s political rivals
will have an incentive to invoke the law to oppose him. Put another way,
legal argumentation might have a salience with the media, the public at
large, and influential elites that could provide presidential opponents in
Congress and elsewhere with an incentive to criticize executive actions in
legal terms. If such criticism gains traction in a given context, it could
enable the President’s congressional opponents to impose even greater
costs on him through a variety of means, ranging from oversight hearings
to, in the extreme case, threats of impeachment. Thus, so long as the
threat of such sanctions is credible, law will impose an external
constraint—whether or not the President himself or those responsible
for carrying out his policies have internalized the law as a normative
matter. The prospect of political sanctions might help explain, for
example, why modern Presidents do not seem to seriously contemplate
disregarding Supreme Court decisions.141 And if Presidents are constrained to follow the practice-based norm of judicial supremacy, they
may be constrained to follow other normative practices that do not
involve the courts.
Work by political scientists concerning the use of military force is at
least suggestive of how a connection between public sanctions and law
compliance might work. As this work shows, the opposition party in
Congress, especially during times of divided government, will have both
an incentive and the means to use the media to criticize unsuccessful
presidential uses of force. The additional political costs that the
opposition party is able to impose in this way will in turn make it less
likely that Presidents will engage in large-scale military operations.142 It is
at least conceivable, as the legal theorist Fred Schauer has suggested, that
the political cost of pursuing an ultimately unpopular policy initiative
(such as engaging in a war) goes up with the perceived illegality of the
141. Cf. Levinson, Parchment, supra note 14, at 661 (explaining “an effective system
of constitutional law must be in some sense self-enforcing regardless of judicial review”
because powerful political actors need some reason to adhere to judiciary’s
pronouncements).
142. See, e.g., William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather:
Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers 155 (2007); Douglas L. Kriner, After the
Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War 147 (2010).
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initiative.143 If that is correct, then actors will require more assurance of
policy success before potentially violating the law. This should count as a
legal constraint on policymaking even if the relevant actors themselves
do not see any normative significance in the legal rule in question.
Moreover, even if Madisonian checks and balances do not work
systematically, in at least some instances Congress (or a particular house
of Congress) is likely to use its institutional authority to resist what it
perceives to be unlawful presidential behavior. For example, consider the
phenomenon of “congressional-executive agreements,” which are
international agreements concluded by the United States with the
support of a majority of both houses of Congress rather than the twothirds advice and consent of the Senate that Article II of the Constitution
specifies for treaties. A large percentage of the international agreements
entered into by the United States since the 1930s have taken the form of
congressional-executive agreements,144 but there is substantial debate
and uncertainty about the extent to which the congressional-executive
agreement process is constitutionally interchangeable with the Article II
treaty process.145 For some subject areas, bipartisan leadership in the
Senate has insisted that the Constitution requires resort to the Article II
process, and in these instances Presidents have generally acceded to the
Senate’s position. This is particularly evident in the area of arms
control,146 although it seems likely that there would be similar senatorial
143. See Schauer, Political Risks, supra note 93, at 84–85. But cf. Frederick Schauer,
Is Legality Political?, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 481, 505 (2011) (suggesting possibility that
“the practice of following the law just because it is the law . . . is far less rewarded by the
electorate and in public political life than is commonly supposed”).
144. See Cong. Research Serv., Treaties and Other International Agreements: The
Role of the United States Senate 38–39 (Comm. Print 2001).
145. Compare, e.g., Ackerman & Golove, supra note 46 (arguing in favor of full
interchangeability, based on controversial theory of constitutional change), with Spiro,
Treaties, supra note 46 (arguing historical practice does not support full
interchangeability).
146. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 473–74. With the exception of an
interim agreement in 1972, all major arms control agreements since World War II have
been concluded as Article II treaties. In providing its advice and consent to various such
treaties, the Senate has issued accompanying declarations stating that significant arms
control agreements should be concluded only pursuant to the treaty power and not by
congressional-executive agreement. See, e.g., Spiro, Treaties, supra note 46, at 997
(quoting S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-22, at 81 (1991)). In response to Senate pressure in 1997,
President Clinton abandoned plans to conclude an update to the Treaty on Armed
Conventional Forces in Europe by means of a congressional-executive agreement and
instead submitted it to the Senate for approval as an Article II treaty. See Phillip R.
Trimble & Alexander W. Koff, All Fall Down: The Treaty Power in the Clinton
Administration, 16 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 55, 56 (1998). In 2002, when President Bush
suggested an intent to conclude a nuclear arms reduction agreement with Russia and was
vague about the form it would take, the ranking Democratic and Republican members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote to him insisting that any such agreement
needed to be submitted to the Senate. See Thom Shanker, Senators Insist on Role in
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resistance to congressional-executive agreements in certain other subject
areas such as human rights.147 In at least some instances, in other words,
institutional checks will operate to facilitate the constraining effect of
law.
C. Existence of Legal Dialogue
Although this Essay has divided its discussion of internal and
external constraints, in many contexts they probably do not operate
independently. In particular, it seems plausible that practices followed
out of fear of external sanctions can become internalized as a result of
habit, or what has been called the “normative power of the actual”—that
is, the tendency of people to give normative significance to that with
which they are familiar.148 Conversely, the internalization of a norm
associated with a practice can plausibly affect the likelihood that actors
with an interest in the practice will impose external sanctions for violations. Beyond these general points of interrelation, the internal and external accounts of legal constraint might operate interdependently
through the existence of something that has received relatively little
treatment in the literature on presidential power: the simple fact that
public debate about presidential action frequently includes considerations of legality. The pervasive existence of public “law talk” may itself be
evidence of, and a mechanism promoting, law’s constraining effect—for
both internal and external reasons.
The executive branch almost always endeavors to argue that its
actions are lawful—and to rebut criticisms to the contrary.149 When
questions about the legality of a given program or action arise, very
Nuclear Arms Deals, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2002, at 16. President Bush subsequently did
submit the agreement to the Senate, and it was approved in 2003, by a vote of 95-0. Amy F.
Woolf, Cong. Research Serv., RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty 16 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31448.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
147. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 475–76.
148. The phrase apparently originated with Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre
[General Theory of the State] 338 (1921); see also Morris Cohen, The Basis of
Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 582 (1933) (stating ceremonies “have what Jellinek has
called the normative power of the actual, that is, they control what we do by creating a
standard of respectability or a pattern to which we feel bound to conform”).
149. Even President Lincoln’s famous “all the laws, but one” claim—namely that, in
order to save the Union, he was justified in unilaterally suspending habeas corpus at the
outset of the Civil War even if it violated the Constitution’s allocation of the suspension
power—was simply a backup argument. His principal claim was that the suspension was
fully compliant with the Constitution. See President Abraham Lincoln, Message to
Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln
421, 429–31 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (asserting privilege of writ of habeas corpus may be
legally suspended “when, in cases of rebellion, or invasion, the public safety does require
it”).
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commonly the executive will release some sort of analysis defending the
action in legal terms. Recent examples from the Obama Administration
include its public release, shortly after the March 2011 commencement
of the U.S. military campaign in Libya, of OLC’s opinion concluding that
the President had the authority to initiate the campaign without congressional authorization;150 its reliance in the summer of 2011 on written and
oral testimony from the State Department Legal Adviser that the Libya
operation did not constitute “hostilities” within the meaning of the War
Powers Resolution;151 and its public release in January 2012 of an OLC
opinion concluding that the President’s authority to make “recess
appointments” applied even in an intrasession recess of the Senate,
during which the Senate met in pro forma session every few days.152 An
earlier example from the George W. Bush Administration is its public
release of a December 2005 letter to Congress, followed by a January
2006 Justice Department white paper, providing legal arguments in
support of a secret (but recently leaked) terrorist surveillance program
conducted by the National Security Agency.153
In all of these examples, the substance (and sometimes the process)
of the executive branch’s legal arguments faced substantial criticism.154

150. Krass Memorandum, supra note 33.
151. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
112th Cong. 14 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State)
[hereinafter Koh Statement].
152. See Memorandum Opinion from Virginia A. Seitz, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to the Counsel to the President, Lawfulness of Recess
Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma
Sessions (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessionsopinion.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
153. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the
National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), reprinted in 81 Ind.
L.J. 1374 (2006); Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legislative Affs., Dep’t of Justice, to the Leadership of the Senate Select Comm. on
Intelligence & the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005),
reprinted in 81 Ind. L.J. 1360 (2006). The program defended in these documents was the
successor to the program referenced supra at text accompanying notes 137–138.
154. For criticism of the Obama Administration’s treatment of various legal issues
relating to the Libya military operation, see, e.g., Glennon, supra note 33, at 1; Morrison,
Libya, supra note 100, at 65–67; Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War,
N.Y. Times, June 21, 2011, at A27; Editorial, War by Any Other Name, Wash. Post, June 18,
2011, at A14.
For criticism of the Bush Administration’s defense of its secret surveillance program,
see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., February 2, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former
Government Officials to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice Department
Whitepaper of January 19, 2006, in 81 Ind. L.J. 1415 (2006); Curtis A. Bradley et. al,
January 9, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former Government Officials to Congressional
Leadership in Response to Justice Department Letter of December 22, 2005, in 81 Ind. L.J.
1364 (2006); Memorandum from David Kris, Former Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. (Jan. 25,
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Indeed, we have advanced some of those criticisms in other writings. Our
point here, however, is not to parse the specific merits of the arguments
advanced in any of these examples. Instead, our point is to underscore
the fact that, in each example, legal argumentation was evidently seen as
a critical component of the public defense of the executive’s actions.
Legality apparently had sufficient salience for the executive branch to
attend to it, and to do so in a way that could hope to seem persuasive or
at least plausible to interested audiences.
Certain institutional design features also reflect an appreciation of
the value to the President of credible legal argumentation. Perhaps most
notably, the maintenance of an OLC whose traditions at least partially
insulate it from political pressures, together with the practice of treating
OLC’s opinions as presumptively binding across the executive branch,
collectively reflect an understanding that OLC’s opinions are most
valuable if they appear to take the law seriously, and that presidential
invocations of such opinions are most effective when they do not appear
purely opportunistic. Similar observations could be made about certain
other executive branch legal offices. The Solicitor General’s Office, for
example, which relies on a staff composed primarily of career attorneys
to represent the United States before the Supreme Court, is influential in
part because of the perception that it has a degree of political independence.155 The Justice Department also has an Office of Professional
Responsibility that is charged with “investigating allegations of misconduct involving Department attorneys that relate to the exercise of
their authority to investigate, litigate or provide legal advice, as well as
allegations of misconduct by law enforcement personnel when related to
allegations of attorney misconduct within the jurisdiction of OPR.”156
2006), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/kris.fisa.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
For criticism of OLC’s defense of President Obama’s 2012 recess appointments, see,
e.g., Executive Overreach: The President’s Unprecedented “Recess” Appointments:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10–20 (2012) (statement of
Charles J. Cooper, Partner, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC); Edwin Meese III & Todd Gaziano, OpEd., Obama’s Abuse of Power, Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 2012, at A17.
155. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, The Solicitor General and the United
States Supreme Court: Executive Branch Influence and Judicial Decisions 136 (2012)
(concluding that influence of Solicitor General’s Office on Supreme Court likely comes
from Office’s “objectivity, professionalism, and independence”).
156. Office of Prof’l Responsibility, About OPR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www
.justice.gov/opr/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). In
2009, the Office concluded that the OLC attorneys involved in drafting the infamous
“torture memos” during the Bush Administration had committed “professional
misconduct” by failing to provide “thorough, candid, and objective” analysis. Office of
Prof’l Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t Just., Report: Investigation into the Office of Legal
Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s
Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 11 (2009), available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf (on file with the
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More generally, the decision to devote resources to producing
credible legal defenses of executive actions suggests that legality is
salient. This salience could be the product of either of the two basic
causal mechanisms identified above. It could be the result of certain
executive officials’ internalization of legal norms, or it could reflect a
Holmesian understanding of the costs associated with being perceived to
act illegally. As to the latter, the very fact that an administration publicly
invokes a given legal principle to defend its actions can create pressure
for the administration to respect that principle over time. This is what
Jon Elster calls the “civilizing force of hypocrisy.”157 As Elster explains,
“[P]ublic speaking is subject to a consistency constraint. Once a speaker
has adopted an impartial argument because it corresponds to his interest
or prejudice, he will be seen as opportunistic if he deviates from it when
it ceases to serve his needs.”158 Although this constraint is not unique to
legal dialogue, it helps explain why supplying public legal justifications
for one’s actions can serve to constrain future actions.
Over time, moreover, the internal and external constraints might
merge. If successfully defending the legality of one’s actions has a
political value, law may come to be partly constitutive of an official’s
preferences. Rational choice perspectives on individual and institutional
behavior sometimes appear to take an actor’s interests as fixed and then
to examine various strategies for maximizing those interests. Yet it seems
plausible to posit a more dynamic relationship. Political self-interest
might not only incentivize attentiveness to law but also become partially
constituted by the perceived legal status of one’s actions.159 A President,
for example, might be committed to defending the legality of his actions
Columbia Law Review). On review, the Justice Department agreed with many of the Office’s
criticisms of the memos but rejected the Office’s finding of professional misconduct. See
Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Who Wrote Terror Memos, N.Y. Times, Feb.
20, 2010, at A1.
157. Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution 236,
250 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (emphasis omitted); see also Ian Johnstone, LawMaking Through the Operational Activities of International Organizations, 40 Geo. Wash.
Int’l L. Rev. 87, 120–21 (2008) (“Having made rhetorical commitments, speakers feel
some pressure to match their words with deeds. Otherwise, they would be branded as
blatantly hypocritical, which would defeat the purpose of making the argument in the first
place.”); Richard H. McAdams, Resentment, Excuse and Norms, in The Hart-Fuller
Debate in the Twenty-First Century 249, 253 (Peter Cane ed., 2010) (discussing norm
internalization and noting “it is difficult to resist applying one’s normative beliefs
concerning the behavior of others to one’s own behavior”).
158. Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in Deliberative Democracy 97,
104 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) [hereinafter Elster, Deliberation] (emphasis omitted); see also
Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 Int’l Org. 1, 23
(2000) (referring to same basic mechanism as “argumentative self-entrapment”).
159. See Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 1002 (“[E]xternal
constraints not only reinforce, but also help shape, officials’ perceptions of their
obligations.”).
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not just because it would yield success in the pursuit of his interests independent of law, but also because being perceived to act lawfully is itself
part of what he wants from his presidency.160
Still, to say that legality is partially constitutive of an actor’s interests
is not necessarily to say that legal dialogue is a constraint. Law could have
a rhetorical salience (like appeals to fairness, or “the good”) without
imposing any real constraint if any position could be defended as lawful.
For it to be a constraint, legal dialogue must be subject to some validity
or at least plausibility limits.161 This returns to some of the points made
above with respect to the internalization of legal norms: Even if the goal
is merely to establish the plausibility of a legal position (as opposed to its
being consistent with the best view of the law), law acts as a constraint if
the norms of legal reasoning or professional responsibility impose at least
some barriers.162
Admittedly, the law in many areas is open-ended and malleable, and
arguments that might once have seemed beyond the pale can (perhaps
in response to political or policy preferences) come to be accepted as
plausible. This may be especially so for questions of executive power unlikely to be addressed by a court, because the absence of a final judicial
arbiter may leave the substance of the law more uncertain and subject to
competing characterizations. But it would be a significant—and we
believe unwarranted—leap to conclude that the law is so manipulable
that legal dialogue imposes no constraints on the President whatsoever.
Of course, this analysis does not necessarily yield the conclusion that
the constraints associated with legal dialogue are robust. The relative
strength of such constraints can be determined only through difficult
empirical work. Moreover, the degree of this constraint probably depends on the relative strength of other institutions. In the United States,
it is likely that the existence of institutions such as a free press, an
organized bar, an extensive university system, and an active NGO community enhance the constraint imposed by the salience of law in public
dialogue. That constraint would presumably be weaker in a country with-

160. Cf. Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52
B.C. L. Rev. 1551, 1555 (2011) (“Certain conceptions of how to exercise power are part of
the settled grammar of each office. In addition to these role-specific constraints, a
president is also bound by the virtues and excellences that define what it means to fulfill
the office’s duties well.”).
161. Cf. Elster, Deliberation, supra note 158, at 104.
162. See Levinson, Parchment, supra note 14, at 709 (arguing notions of legal
plausibility “can serve to narrow the range of political disagreement on some issues and to
rule some options off the table”); see also Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. Legal Educ. 518, 526 (1986) (“[L]aw
constrains as a physical medium constrains—you can’t do absolutely anything you want
with a pile of bricks, and what you can do depends on how many you have, as well as your
other circumstances.”).
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out such institutions, and might approach zero in a dictatorship that
simply mouthed legal platitudes without any risk of criticism from
skeptical audiences. The point is simply that, at least with respect to the
U.S. presidency, the phenomenon of extensive legal dialogue is both
suggestive of, and plausibly a contributing factor to, some degree of
constraint.
D. Libya and “Hostilities”
In order to make the discussion in the preceding sections more
concrete while also identifying some of the difficulties with attempting to
isolate the effect of law on presidential action, this Part concludes by
considering a recent episode, mentioned earlier, that is thought by many
to involve clear presidential illegality. It involves the Obama
Administration’s treatment of the War Powers Resolution in connection
with the 2011 military operation in Libya. Under the terms of the
Resolution, military operations rising to the level of “hostilities” must
cease (or at least be drawn down to the point that they are no longer
hostilities) within sixty days if not authorized by Congress.163 Distinct
from the question of the President’s authority to initiate the Libya operation without congressional authorization,164 the question here was
whether the operation constituted “hostilities” as used in the Resolution
and thus was subject to its sixty-day cutoff.
The Obama Administration answered no. Although the operation
ultimately lasted longer than sixty days and was never authorized by
Congress, the Administration insisted that such authorization was unnecessary under the War Powers Resolution because the operation did
not constitute “hostilities.”165 In testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh
placed heavy reliance upon a 1975 letter to Congress from the then-State
Department Legal Adviser and Defense Department General Counsel.
That letter stated that the Executive Branch understood “hostilities” to
refer to “a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively
engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces,” but
not to include “irregular or infrequent violence which may occur in a

163. 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2006).
164. See supra text accompanying note 33.
165. See Koh Statement, supra note 151, at 14–16. Press reports claimed that OLC
had reached the conclusion that the Libya operation did constitute “hostilities,” but that
the White House decided not to adhere to that position. E.g., Charlie Savage, 2 Top
Lawyers Lose Argument on War Power, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2011, at A1. One of us has
raised serious concerns about the process by which that decision was reached, especially if
it did not grant OLC’s legal views the presumptive authoritativeness that they are
customarily accorded. See Morrison, Libya, supra note 100, at 66–74.
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particular area.”166 Koh asserted that President Obama was “operating
within this longstanding tradition of executive branch interpretation”
when he concluded that the Libya operation—which involved
voluminous bombing but little if any exchanges of fire with enemy
forces—did not rise to the level of “hostilities.”167
The Obama Administration’s position has been met with widespread
criticism. Some academics have taken it to be a clear example of presidential illegality.168 Many in Congress also condemned it.169 Yet at the
same time there was no serious effort in Congress to force the President
to comply with the letter of the Resolution.170
How, then, should this episode be understood? One possibility is
that the Obama Administration simply violated the Resolution’s sixty-day
cutoff requirement, and that neither Congress nor the public at large saw
fit to impose any sanction for the violation. On that view, this would
appear to be a clear instance of law’s failure to constrain. Of course, even
if that is the best understanding of what happened, it would not show
that the President is generally unconstrained by law. Virtually every
166. Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, and Martin R.
Hoffmann, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., to Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Int’l Sec. & Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Int’l Relations (June 3, 1975), in War
Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation at Phnom
Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Int’l Sec. & Scientific Affairs of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong.
39 (1975) [hereinafter Leigh & Hoffman Letter]; see also Koh Statement, supra note 151,
at 11 (quoting Leigh & Hoffman Letter, supra).
167. Koh Statement, supra note 151, at 14.
168. See, e.g., Schauer, Political Risks, supra note 93, at 90 (“[I]t seems more than
plausible to treat [the Obama Administration’s argument that the Libya operation did not
constitute ‘hostilities’ under the War Powers Resolution] as so weak as to permit the claim
that the actions simply violated the law in a straightforward way.”); see also Libya and War
Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 45–46 (2011)
(statement of Louis Fisher, Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute) (arguing Obama
Administration violated War Powers Resolution).
169. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, ‘A Lot of this Fuss is Politics,’ Wash. Post, June
30, 2011, at A4 (noting congressional disapproval of White House’s interpretation); David
A. Fahrenthold, Legislators Call Obama’s Action on Libya Illegal, Wash. Post, May 26,
2011, at A6 (noting bipartisan disagreement with White House’s interpretation).
170. A resolution that would have directed the President to remove U.S. forces from
Libya within 15 days was defeated in the House on a vote of 265-148, and, on the same day,
another resolution expressing opposition to the use of ground forces in Libya passed the
House on a vote of 268-145. Richard F. Grimmett, Cong. Research Serv., RL33532, War
Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance 13 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/RL33532.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). A few weeks later, a
resolution that would have authorized the Libyan operations was defeated in the House by
a vote of 295-123. Id. at 14. The full Senate did not hold any votes on resolutions
concerning the Libya operation. Ten members of the House of Representatives sued
President Obama, claiming that he was violating both the Constitution and the War
Powers Resolution, but the case was dismissed for lack of standing. Kucinich v. Obama,
821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011).
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constraint has its limiting case, and the constellation of countervailing
nonlegal considerations at work in the Libya episode may simply have
been too much for the law to withstand.171
Moreover, even if there were presidential illegality in this case, that
fact alone would not mean that law failed to play any constraining role.
Instead, this might be a situation where law’s constraining effect had
more to do with requiring reasonable or plausible legal argumentation.
Given its claimed fidelity to the 1975 Executive Branch letter to
Congress, the Obama Administration’s position, even if ultimately unpersuasive as an account of the best understanding of “hostilities,” might
at least be plausible.172 If the Administration felt compelled to have a
plausible legal account of consistency with the Resolution, then the
Resolution might have had some constraining effect even if it was violated.173
In addition, the law might have had a more observable constraining
effect if the Libya operation had been less successful operationally. If,
instead of quickly toppling the Qadhafi regime, U.S. forces had become
mired in a protracted conflict, it is quite possible that the legal questions
surrounding the operation would have intensified. In that circumstance,
the potential illegality of the operation might have increased its political
costliness to the Obama Administration.174 Although those costs did not
materialize in this particular situation, that does not mean they would fail
to constrain in a different situation where operational success was in
more serious doubt. More generally, a potentially interactive relationship
among operational success, political cost, and legality does not mean that
the last factor imposes no constraint; it merely specifies circumstances in
which that constraint is most likely to engage. Again, to emphasize a
point that runs throughout this Essay, the fact that the law in this area is
interrelated with politics does not show that it is unimportant.
It is also worth emphasizing that, despite a low likelihood of judicial
involvement in the issue, the Obama Administration offered public legal

171. Clearly, there were some distinctive features to this episode that might have
made noncompliance more likely than in other circumstances. Those features include the
fact that some presidential administrations have raised doubts about the constitutionality
of the War Powers Resolution, as well as the low likelihood that Congress would impose
any serious sanctions for violating the Resolution in the Libya operation.
172. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
112th Cong. 48 (2011) (statement of Peter J. Spiro, Professor of Law, Temple University
Beasley School of Law), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2011_hr/libya.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
173. Cf. Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, At Deadline, U.S. Seeks to Continue War
in Libya, N.Y. Times, May 13, 2011, at A10 (reporting “the Obama legal team is now trying
to come up with a plausible theory for why continued participation by the United States
does not violate the [Resolution]”).
174. See Schauer, Political Risks, supra note 93, at 84–85.
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justifications, based heavily on arguments from historical practice, for the
Libya operation. OLC issued an extensive legal opinion in support of the
legality of the initial deployment of force, and high-level Administration
officials testified in support of the legality of continuing the operation
past the sixty-day point. If law were playing no constraining role either
internally or externally, it is not clear why the Administration would have
made those efforts, instead of simply arguing that the operation constituted good policy. After all, the legal arguments were not costless: They
required effort to construct and exposed the Administration to criticism
from those who disagreed with the analysis.
To be sure, the precise way that the Administration defended the
legality of its position on the “hostilities” question raised concerns. Press
reports suggested that views on the question were divided within the
Administration, and that OLC (and others) apparently thought the
operation did constitute hostilities and thus was subject to the sixty-day
cutoff.175 Especially given its reliance upon a written opinion from OLC
to defend the legality of the initial deployment, the Administration’s
decision to reject OLC’s views on the “hostilities” question and to rely
instead on the State Department Legal Adviser to defend the contrary
view appears opportunistic—and worrisome to those who value the tradition of treating OLC’s legal conclusions as presumptively binding within
the executive branch.176 The key point here, however, is that the
Administration did not simply defend the continuation of the Libya
operation on humanitarian or other policy or political grounds. Instead,
even in departing from the apparent views of OLC, it went to considerable lengths to provide a detailed legal defense of its position. The
particulars of that defense may have been less than convincing, but its
very existence highlights the apparent salience of the law in this context.
Given that the Obama Administration was able to continue the Libya
operation while defending its definition of “hostilities,” its definition
might become accepted going forward. Especially in areas like this,
where institutional practice plays such a central role, the best understanding of the law is not necessarily fixed and unchanging. As a result,
actions supported by minimally plausible legal defenses might over time
be understood to exert a gravitational pull on the best understanding of
the law. Such a possibility does not eliminate the prospect of legal
constraint. It does, however, highlight a potential drawback to a practicebased approach to law, at least on issues of presidential power. Put
simply, practice can sometimes sap the law of its constraining power.
That said, it should be noted that the Obama Administration went to
great lengths to tie its conclusion that the Libya operation did not entail
175. See supra note 165.
176. See generally Morrison, Libya, supra note 100 (discussing this “process”
concern).
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“hostilities” to the specific facts of that situation.177 One might question
the legitimacy of artificial attempts to confine the sweep of a precedent at
the very point it is issued.178 Still, the Obama Administration’s contextspecific approach may make it harder for future administrations to
generalize from the Libya episode. And again, if law were imposing no
constraint whatsoever on the Obama Administration’s approach to the
issue, it is not clear why the Administration would have bothered to limit
its claim in this way.
CONCLUSION
Some commentators have suggested that presidential authority has
become “unbounded” by law, and is now governed only or primarily by
politics. At the same time, there has been growing skepticism about the
ability of the familiar political checks on presidential power to work in
any systematic or reliable fashion. This Essay has attempted to understand more precisely what it means for the President to be constrained by
law, and to outline possible mechanisms for such legal constraint. In
doing so, it has resisted any sharp distinction between politics and law
and has identified ways in which the two likely operate together. Politics
and law are best understood not as mutually exclusive but as interactive
in a range of complicated ways, sometimes in tandem and sometimes in
opposition. Such interaction does not mean that law is unimportant or
unconstraining, just as it does not mean that politics are unimportant or
unconstraining.
Ultimately, the extent to which law constrains the President is an
empirical question. In offering illustrations of how law might constrain
presidential power, this Essay has sought to make the analysis more
concrete, not to make systematic claims about what is happening in practice. There are a number of challenges to developing such claims. First,
the problem of observational equivalence can make it difficult to disentangle law-based explanations for a given action from various non-lawbased reasons for the same action. In some situations, this may simply be
177. Harold Koh stressed that (1) “U.S. forces are playing a constrained and
supporting role in a NATO-led multinational civilian protection operation, which is
implementing a U.N. Security Council Resolution tailored to that limited purpose,” (2)
“our operations have not involved U.S. casualties or a threat of significant U.S. casualties,”
(3) “U.S. military operations have not involved the presence of U.S. ground troops, or any
significant chance of escalation into a broader conflict,” and (4) “[t]his situation does not
present the kind of ‘full military engagement[] with which the [War Powers] Resolution is
primarily concerned.’” Koh contended that, “[h]ad any of these elements been absent in
Libya, or present in different degrees, a different legal conclusion might have been
drawn.” See Koh Statement, supra note 151, at 7–11.
178. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities.”).
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the result of the fact that both legal and extralegal norms point in the
same direction. In others, certain non-law-based reasons may themselves
be affected by law. The sense that something is immoral, for example,
might be based in part on a sense that it is unlawful (and vice versa).179
Second, as discussed earlier, disputes over the content and meaning
of the law often make it unclear whether the legal norm has been
followed. If the law in a given area is so malleable or undeveloped as to
admit of any interpretation that the regulated actor might prefer, it is
difficult to see how the law could be said to impose any meaningful
constraint. Yet it can be difficult to separate such cases from cases of
legitimate but bounded disagreement over the law. Practice-based law is
probably more likely to suffer from this difficulty than law grounded in
clear textual provisions, especially if there is little prospect of authoritative judicial review. The problem is compounded in circumstances
where the law-complying standard to which the relevant actors are held
does not follow the “best” view of the law but merely ensures that there is
a reasonable or plausible legal basis for their actions.
Third, focusing on the law’s impact on actions actually taken by the
President or other executive actors threatens to obscure the potentially
much broader universe of actions not taken. Identifying relevant
“nonevents,” however, is extremely difficult. Moreover, even when a
given nonevent is identifiable, the reason why it did not transpire may be
elusive. Although legal considerations might explain why certain actions
were not taken or even seriously considered, the fact that a forgone
action would have been legally controversial or even indefensible does
not mean it was forgone for that reason. Furthermore, government
officials do not typically provide public explanations for why they are not
taking particular actions, and even when they do, the explanation may be
self-serving. Internal deliberations relating to nonactions may be
especially difficult to access with respect to the presidency, where norms
of confidentiality will often apply.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, some empirical investigation
should be possible in this area. It would be useful to consider, for
example, modern instances in which Congress has resisted presidential
action and framed its resistance in explicitly legal terms. Of course, the
mere presence of an objection articulated in legal terms does not mean
that the law was the principal motivating factor. As explained elsewhere,
congressional resistance to presidential action is heavily affected by

179. See, e.g., Leonard Berkowitz & Nigel Walker, Laws and Moral Judgments, 30
Sociometry 410, 412 (1967) (“Laws may often be taken as implying a social consensus, and
this implied consensus could influence attitudes toward the behavior that is the subject of
the laws.”); cf. Hart, supra note 112, at 7 (“Not only do law and morals share a vocabulary
so that there are both legal and moral obligations, duties, and rights; but all municipal
legal systems reproduce the substance of certain fundamental moral requirements.”).
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political partisanship.180 Especially in times of divided government, congressional resistance that is articulated in legal terms may be principally
motivated by partisan concerns. When members of Congress from the
President’s own party join in a legal objection, however, it might be fair
to infer that concern for the law itself provides a greater part of the
motivation for the objection.
In addition to being intertwined with partisanship, legally articulated
objections by members of Congress are probably more likely to occur
when the objectors disagree with the action as a matter of policy. As
political science literature has made clear, a significant motivation for
members of Congress is reelection, which means that they tend to be
focused more on their constituents’ policy preferences than on
Congress’s institutional prerogatives.181 Still, there may be instances
where legal concerns stand apart from policy considerations, such as
where Congress resists presidential action on legal grounds but
subsequently approves the action once its legal concerns are resolved.
(Senatorial insistence that arms control agreements be concluded as
Article II treaties, discussed in Part III.B, is a potential example.)
The more fundamental point, however, is that the mere existence of
partisan or policy motivations to resist a particular presidential action
does not disqualify congressional resistance articulated in legal terms
from counting as an instance of legal constraint. Law, politics, and policy
are best viewed not as mutually exclusive but as overlapping, interactive
domains. For example, as discussed above, the political costs of unpopular or unsuccessful presidential actions may go up with their
perceived illegality. Certainly it is possible to think of examples—the
Iran-Contra scandal, for instance—that might illustrate such a
phenomenon.182 If so, then even if legally articulated congressional
resistance is entirely opportunistic, the ability of Congress to marshal
credible legal objections can produce a form of constraint.183 Empirical

180. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 443.
181. See id. at 442.
182. The Iran-Contra scandal involved the secret facilitation by the Reagan
Administration of arms sales to Iran in an effort to secure the release of hostages, and the
diversion of some of the funds from the sales to support rebels in Nicaragua, despite a
statutory ban on such support. After the scheme was discovered in 1986, the Reagan
Administration suffered substantial political damage. See R.W. Apple Jr., The Iran Affair:
A Presidency Damaged, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, at A1. Reagan’s popularity rebounded,
however, before the end of his presidency.
183. A similar observation might be made about the link between law and policy. In
deciding on a course of action, Presidents presumably seek to avoid policy failure. Legal
uncertainty can potentially affect this calculation by creating a higher risk of such failure.
In the debt ceiling debate, for example, the legal uncertainty generated by unilateral
presidential action could have contributed to difficulties in the bond markets, which in
turn could have harmed the U.S. economy. If legal considerations make policy failure
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investigation of this sort of hypothesized exacerbation of political cost
(through the use of opinion polls, for example) would be useful.
Internal constraints on presidential action will be more difficult to
verify empirically, in part because of norms of confidentiality
surrounding executive branch decisionmaking. Still, to the extent that
internal accounts of such decisionmaking are or become available, they
can be very instructive. To take an example mentioned earlier, it would
be useful to know more about the legal deliberations in 2011 (and again
in late 2012 and early 2013) associated with the Obama Administration’s
decision not to attempt unilaterally to exceed the statutory debt ceiling.
With the passage of time, the details of such internal deliberations are
more likely to be disclosed,184 although there are of course dangers that
after-the-fact recollections will be self-serving or otherwise distorted.
Identifiable examples of resistance by executive branch attorneys to contemplated presidential action—for example, in the form of publicly
disclosed OLC opinions185—can also be at least suggestive of constraints
on particular issues.186
In sum, although there are a number of obstacles to pursuing
systematic empirical investigation of law’s constraining effect in this area,
they may not be insurmountable. As a first step, successful empirical
research depends on asking the right questions. To that end, this Essay
has sought to clarify the primary analytical issues and to articulate plausible hypotheses that might help frame future research.

more likely, they can affect the President’s decisionmaking even if he has not internalized
the legal norms as such.
184. As noted above, an informal report from a former Obama Administration
official suggests that law did indeed operate as a constraint. See Jarmul, supra note 83.
185. A 2010 memorandum outlining best practices for the provision of legal advice
by OLC embraces “the presumption that [OLC] should make its significant opinions fully
and promptly available to the public.” 2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum, supra note
130, at 5. In contrast, the 2005 memorandum that the 2010 memorandum replaced
acknowledged no comparable presumption and stressed instead the importance of
“[m]aintaining the confidentiality of OLC opinions.” 2005 OLC Best Practices
Memorandum, supra note 130, at 4. It is unclear, however, whether OLC has in fact
disclosed its opinions at a greater rate in recent years than it did previously.
186. Cf. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1718–19 (noting
various such examples as well as examples that seem to point in other direction, and
explaining why simply counting “yes” rate in written OLC opinions will not yield fully
accurate picture of extent to which OLC constrains White House).
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